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Interested in getting published in the Gettysburg College
Journal of the Civil War Era?
If you or anyone you know has written an undergraduate
paper in the past five years about the Civil War Era or its
lasting memory and meets the following categories and
requirements, then please consider visiting our website at
http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/gcjwe/ and enter your work for
consideration for next year’s publication.
Requirements and Categories for Publication:
Submissions should be typed in 12-point Times New
Roman font and submitted as a Word document
1. Academic Essays: We are interested in original
research with extensive use of primary and secondary
sources. Possible Topics include but are not limited to
military history, social history, race, reconstruction,
memory, reconciliation, politics, the home front,
etc. 6,000 words or less.
2. Book Reviews: Any non-fiction Civil War related book
published in the last two years. Authors should have
knowledge of the relevant literature to review. 700
words or less.
3. Historical Non-fiction Essays: This category is for nonfiction works regarding the Civil War that are not
necessarily of an academic nature. Examples of this
include essays in public history of the war, study of the
re-enactment culture, current issues in the Civil War
field such as the sesquicentennial, etc. Creativity is

i

encouraged in this category as long as it remains a nonfiction piece. 2,000 to 6,000 words.

Any student with an interest in the Civil War may submit a
piece, including graduate students as long as the work
submitted is undergraduate work written within the past
five years. If your submission is selected, your work will be
published online and in a print journal, which you will
receive a copy of for your own enjoyment.
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A Letter from the Editors
We are thrilled to present you with the fifth volume
of the Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War Era. It
has been our pleasure to select the best of the submissions
we received for this year’s issue. Although we could not
accept every submission, the opportunity to read through a
fine array of undergraduate work allowed us new insights
into the Civil War Era and the way in which it is being
interpreted by budding young scholars.
We owe a great breadth of gratitude to our devoted
team of associate editors: Heather Clancy (’15), Brianna
Kirk (’15), Bobby Novak (’15), Steven Semmel (’16),
Thomas Nank (’16), Anika Jensen (’18), and Julia Sippel
(’18). In addition, we would like to extend our thanks to
our advisor, Dr. Peter Carmichael, for providing guidance
and support throughout the editorial process. Naturally, we
are also indebted to our predecessors who served on the
editorial board in years past and who blazed a trail for us to
follow as we prepared this year’s issue for publication.
This volume is comprised of three academic essays,
our first-ever battle narrative, and a book review. Together,
these pieces span the breadth of the field – from traditional
and cultural military history to social and cultural history.
The issue opens with “‘Servants, Obey Your Masters’:
Southern Representations of the Religious Lives of Slaves”
by Lindsey K. D. Wedow, who argues that the Southern
justification of slavery relied in no small part upon
contradictory assumptions about slaves’ dependence on
their masters for access to Christianity. In “Men and
iii

Machines: The Psychological Impact of Gunboats on the
Fort Henry and Donelson Campaign,” S. Marianne Johnson
examines how the fear and awe inspired by ironclad
gunboats was disproportionate to their efficacy in brownwater warfare. In his piece, Peter Bautz refutes the notion
that Union veterans were passive or complicit in allowing
the memory of the Civil War to be hijacked by
reconciliationists in “The Memory of Battle Surrounds You
Once Again: Iowa Grand Army of the Republic Reunions
and the Formation of a Pro-Union Nationalism, 18861949.” In the first battle narrative ever published in our
journal, Ryan T. Quint traces Ambrose Burnside’s return to
the Army of the Potomac and discusses the role played by
the Ninth Army Corps during the Battle of Spotsylvania
Court House. We close with associate editor Brianna Kirk’s
review of William A. Blair’s 2014 monograph With Malice
Toward Some: Treason and Loyalty in the Civil War Era.
It is our hope that this journal will provide you, our
reader, with a sense of the great work being produced by
the undergraduate students who represent the future of the
field. We are thus incredibly proud of the 2015 volume of
the Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War Era and
hope you enjoy the outstanding work within.
Sincerely,
Bryan G. Caswell, Gettysburg College Class of 2015
Kevin P. Lavery, Gettysburg College Class of 2016
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“Servants, Obey Your Masters”: Southern
Representations of the Religious Lives of Slaves
Lindsey K. Wedow
In 1841 white members of the First Baptist Church
in Richmond, Virginia constructed a new church building.
The old church building, which had previously housed a
multiracial congregation, was purchased by the
congregation’s black members and effectively became
known as the First African Baptist Church. White
members of the First Baptist Church in Richmond had been
uncomfortable for some time with the fact that white
Christians were a minority at the church. It was therefore
determined that the white and black members of the
congregation would disjoin and worship in separate
buildings. 1 Robert Ryland, minister thereafter of the First
African Baptist Church in Richmond described this split,
explaining that
Some very fastidious people did not like to
resort to a church where so many colored folks
congregated, and this was thought to operate
against the growth of the white portion of the
audience. The discipline and culture of the
colored people, too, were felt by the pastor to be
a heavy burden to his mind, requiring more time
and attention than he could give them, and yet
satisfy the expectations of the whites. After long
and mature consultation, it was decided to build
a new and more tasteful edifice for the whites,

1

Rev. Robert Ryland, Reminiscences of the First African Church in
Richmond (VA: American Baptist Memorial, 1855), 262.
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and to dispose of the old one to the blacks, for
their exclusive accommodation.2

This split of a community of worshippers into two on the
basis of race reveals much about the relationship between
white and black Christians in the years leading up to and
during the American Civil War. Following Nat Turner’s
Rebellion in 1831 it was determined by the majority of
slaveholders and proslavery individuals that allowing
slaves to hold religious gatherings without the supervision
of white persons was too dangerous. Specifically, the fear
was that slaves would use religious meetings as a cover for
planning further rebellion. Yet still feeling it a duty to
provide slaves with religious instruction, it became
common practice for Southern churches to allow
multiracial congregations.
Thus, on the one hand, the founding of the First
African Baptist Church in Richmond looks like an excellent
opportunity for black Christians to gain their own church
building and some religious independence. Yet what this
instance also reveals is the strained paternalism that was the
foundation of proslavery Christianity. By analyzing
proslavery evangelical representations of the religious
instruction of slaves we begin to understand how
proslavery evangelicals truly believed themselves to be
doing the work of God. When the institution of slavery
came under attack from antislavery evangelicals and
abolitionists, proslavery evangelicals constructed an
elaborate defense based on their perception of themselves
as God’s chosen actors. This defense, and the strong
religious zeal that informed it, helped to bring about the
American Civil War and to perpetuate the conflict. Each
2

2

Ryland, Reminiscences of the First African Church, 262-263.
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side felt that they were justified by God almighty and that
they had a duty to fight to the bitter end.
This paper examines sources ranging from sermons
by proslavery evangelicals and articles in proslavery
religious periodicals, to books published by proslavery
evangelicals and the public records of societies devoted to
the religious education of slaves. Though many of these
sources have been examined by scholars before, they have
not necessarily been examined with an eye to depictions of
slave’s religious education and what those depictions have
to say about the motives and beliefs of proslavery
Christians. This paper contends that when read through a
critical lens, sermons offer insight into how proslavery
Christians used representations of the religious lives of
slaves to construct a justification for the institution of
slavery. When viewed in the specifically evangelical
context of the American South, this justification reveals
some important contradictions. First, in order to maintain a
defense of slavery, proslavery Christians were forced to
contradict their own belief in, and celebration of, the free
accessibility of Christ’s salvation. Proslavery Christians,
though they were evangelicals, represented slaves as in
need of the mediation of white Christians in order to
achieve salvation. This insistence on the permanent need
for white mediation resulted in a depiction of the spiritual
condition of slaves as constantly in a state of disrepair.
Thus while the aid of white Christians was supposed to
bring about the salvation of slaves, and missionaries always
seemed to report positive spiritual improvement among
their slave congregations, proslavery Christians also had to
maintain a permanent position for themselves as spiritual
instructors in order to justify slaveholding to the rest of the
world. Therefore we find then in documents from the
period contradictory representations of the religious lives of
3
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slaves which are strategically crafted to serve the purposes
of proslavery Christians.
As famously described by David Bebbington,
evangelicalism is marked by four distinctive elements.
First, evangelicals practice conversionism, in which new
believers are expected to depart with their former habits
and completely change their lives; this is commonly called
being “born again.” 3 Secondly, evangelicals employ
biblicism, meaning that they take the Bible as highly
authoritative and often identify directly with the biblical
text. 4 Next, evangelicals exercise what Bebbington calls
“crucicentrism,” which places emphasis on the saving grace
of Christ’s death and resurrection; the salvation offered by
Jesus is central to Protestantism in general, but is even
more paramount for evangelicalism. 5 Lastly, evangelicals
are said to engage in activism, meaning that they choose to
express their faith in a strikingly passionate manner. For
this reason a great deal of emphasis is placed upon zealous
preaching and proselytizing. 6 These doctrines of
evangelical Christianity shaped the culture of the Southern
United States, giving rise to strict codes of honor and duty
and a vision of the South as a place of Christian tradition.
Proslavery Southerners believed that God had given
them the South and all of its prosperity as a blessing. This
blessing included the institution of slavery. Rev. Robert
Wightman expressed these sentiments in an 1861 sermon
that he delivered to the congregation of the Methodist
Episcopal Church in Yorkville, S.C. saying,

3

David Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from
the 1730s to the 1980s (Routledge, 2003), 8.
4
Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 10.
5
Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 13.
6
Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 15.
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They are the gifts of God. The pillar of cloud
dropped fertilizing dew on our soil, and the
pillar of fire brought across the ocean the only
tillers who could survive pestilence, and wring
from the sod the bloom of silver and harvests of
gold. God blessed our land, and gave to Ham the
privilege of mitigating his “curse” by spreading
Christianity with the labor of his hands.7

Here, Wightman demonstrates the opinion held by many
proslavery Christians that they were the chosen people of
God and as such had a right and a duty to defend what had
been entrusted to them. The quote also exposes how
proslavery Christians used established beliefs about the
inferiority and wretchedness of African peoples to justify
their own actions. Wightman draws on the well-established
idea that African peoples were descendants of Ham, the son
whom Noah cursed in the book of Genesis. This served to
take the responsibility for slavery off of proslavery
Christians and place it on the will of God as mediated
through the actions of Noah. This also allowed Proslavery
Christians to claim that the argument that slavery defied
Christianity was blasphemous since the enslavement of
African peoples was clearly intended by God.
Thus we see what Bebbington refers to as biblicism
at work. The insistence on a literal interpretation of the
Bible became perhaps the key element of the debate
between antislavery and proslavery evangelical Christians.
Proslavery Christians saw themselves as the chosen heirs of
a rich, fertile promised land, much like the Israelites of the
Old Testament. Meanwhile their Northern brethren had to
7

Rev. John T. Wightman, “The Glory of God: The Defense of the
South: A Discourse Delivered in the Methodist Episcopal Church,
South” (ME, 1871), 8.
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etch out a living in the cold, harsh climates of the North.
This fed into an established Southern Christian
conceptualization of Southerners as the keepers of the true
Christianity. 8 Northerners, with their abolitionist and
capitalist ideas, had strayed away from the true religion and
subsequently had not received the same abundant blessings.
These ideas were later shattered by the outcome of the Civil
War, but they were central to the way in which proslavery
evangelicals understood themselves as opposed to
antislavery evangelicals.
Proslavery Christians also
attempted to deflect the responsibility for slavery from
themselves by accusing Northerners of making slavery
necessary with their money hungry capitalist economy. 9
Because evangelicals understood the Bible to be
completely authoritative it became imperative to both
antislavery and proslavery Christians that they were able to
prove that the Bible either did or did not sanction slavery.
This explains the staggering volume of writing from both
sides attempting to demonstrate how Biblical scripture
could be used to justify their cause. 10 Proslavery
evangelicals insisted that because the Bible contains
examples of the great men of God, such as Noah and
Moses, holding slaves it must have meant that it was
permissible for Southern planters to hold slaves as well.
Proslavery evangelicals also seized on the Epistle of
Philemon in which the apostle Paul wrote to a Christian
man named Philemon in order to return his runaway slave,
Onesimus. Proslavery evangelicals selectively highlighted
that Paul was proposing to return Onesimus to Philemon
8

Mark Noll, The Civil War as a Theological Crisis (NC: University of
North Carolina Press, 2006), 52.
9
Noll. The Civil War as a Theological Crisis, 53.
10
Albert J. Harrill, The Manumission of Slaves in Early Christianity
(Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1995), 81-82.
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and paid little attention to the rest of the epistle in which
Paul implored Philemon to receive Onesimus not as a slave,
but as a brother in Christ. Proslavery Christians also
frequently drew on verses like 1 Corinthians 7:20-24 that
focused on the importance of being content with one’s
station in life. 11
The response from antislavery evangelicals could
not be as directly literal in its interpretation. The actual
words printed in the Bible do in fact reveal that the
patriarchs owned slaves, and do affirm without any
reproach that slaveholding was common practice in the
Roman society that both Christ and later Paul inhabited.
Because of this, some radical abolitionists such as William
Lloyd Garrison rejected the Bible out of hand as a
proslavery book. However, moderate antislavery
evangelicals strove to cultivate a more nuanced biblical
interpretation which relied on Christian humanitarianism
for its strength. 12 Thus antislavery Christians such as James
G. Birney tried to refute proslavery evangelicals with
logical explanations for the Bible’s lack of antislavery text.
Birney wrote,
The Savior himself said nothing in
condemnation of slavery, although it existed in
great aggravation while he was on earth. He said
nothing about it, and to my apprehension, for
this very good reason, that he did not preach to
the Romans, or to the people of any other
country where slavery prevailed, but to the Jews,
among whom the abolition principles of Moses’

11

The New American Bible (NY, 2011). 1 Corinthians 7:20 reads
“Everyone should remain in the state in which he was called.”
12
Noll, The Civil War as a Theological Crisis, 35.

7

Wedow
laws had already very nearly, if not entirely
extinguished it. 13

Birney went on to argue that just because the Bible
describes the patriarchs holding slaves it did not mean that
God ever intended for white Southerners to become
slaveholders.
Birney’s letter also pointed to another enormous
contention
between
proslavery
and
antislavery
evangelicals. In the worldview of evangelicals every person
was responsible for repenting and seeking reconciliation
with Christ. Thus denying slaves the opportunity to read the
Bible or to gain any religious instruction was as good as
condemning them to hell. This, antislavery evangelicals
said, was the true horror of slavery.
But slaves were not the only ones in danger of
losing their souls according to antislavery Christians.
Slaveholders were also corrupted by slavery. Being in a
constant position of power and possessing the liberty to
inflict punishment and pain on another human being
inevitably caused a person to become apathetic to human
suffering. 14 Slavery also presented strong temptation
toward vice for slaveholders, as evidenced by the immense
number of masters who had illegitimate children with their
female slaves. Antislavery Christians argued that slavery
could not possibly be consistent with the gospel because
God would never approve of an institution that bred such
cruelty and corruption.
Thus the argument over slavery and the
condemnations of the moral condition of both slaves and
13

James G. Birney, “Letter to Ministers and Elders, on the Sin of
Holding Slaves, and the Duty of Immediate Emancipation”, (NY: S.W.
Benedict and Co., 1834), 3.
14
Birney, “Letter to Ministers and Elders”, 2.
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slaveholders by antislavery Christians brought about the
formation of the paternalistic slaveholding ethic. This
debate also provided a strong impetus for the proslavery
church to advance missionary work to slaves. If proslavery
Christians wanted to have any ground to stand on, they had
to prove that those who participated in the institution of
slavery could maintain a high standard of moral conduct. In
order to combat the accusation that slavery was detrimental
to the souls of both slaves and slaveholders, proslavery
Christians used the Bible to construct a paternalistic system
in which it was taught that slaves and slaveholders each had
duties unto one another. The basis for this system was the
all-too-familiar idea that white Christians had a God-given
responsibility to spread their religion and culture amongst
the “heathen” peoples of the world.
As Presbyterian Reverend John C. Young stated in
his sermon entitled “The Duty of Masters”, “The moralist
and the Christian defend the practice of holding human
beings in bondage, only on the ground that they are
incompetent to govern themselves and manage their own
interests successfully.” 15 Therefore proslavery Christians
could comfort themselves with the idea that their slaves
were better off in the United States where they could learn
about Christianity and how to live respectably. This
sentiment had been expressed by Rev. William Meade of
Virginia in 1834. His “Pastoral Letter” was reprinted and
circulated widely in the years leading up to and during the
Civil War. Rev. Meade wrote,

15

Rev. John C. Young, “The Duty of Masters: A Sermon Preached in
Danville, Kentucky in 1846, and then PublishedAt the Unanimous
Request of the Presbyterian Church, Danville (NY: John A. Gray,
1858), 45.
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When we remember how their captive fathers
were brought from a land of Pagan darkness and
cruelty to one of Christian light, and compare
the religious advantages which their descendants
may have, with the horrible superstitions which
yet prevail in Africa, there is a pleasing
consolation in the thought that, notwithstanding
much of evil in their present condition, great
spiritual good may result to their unhappy race
through the knowledge of a Redeemer. But this
must be done through the instrumentality of
man; and it becomes us as Christians to inquire
how far we are concurring with the designs of
Providence and seeking to promote this most
desirable object. 16

This quote from Rev. Meade reveals that the
underlying principal of the slaveholding ethic was that
slavery was ultimately redemptive to the souls of slaves.
Proslavery Christians drew their support for this claim from
“biblical stories of the curse of Ham and the punishment of
Cain.” 17 The majority of white Christians understood little
to nothing of African cultures, but as Rev. Meade
demonstrates they assumed that African religions were
nothing but evil superstition and that practicing them was a
sign of ignorance. Previously white discomfort with
African religions had been a large problem. By the time the
Civil War took place the majority of slaves in the United
States had been born and raised in the United States.
Though a large number of slaves were members of an
16

William Meade, “Pastoral Letter of the Right Reverend William
Meade” (VA: Convocation of Central Virginia 1853), 13.
17
David B. Chesebrough, ed. “God Ordained This War”: Sermons on
the Sectional Crisis (SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991),
147.
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evangelical church, white Christians still characterized their
slaves as practitioners of traditional African religions or at
least as being heavily influenced by them. 18 This made it
easier to claim that slaves were naturally given to a
heathenish nature and thus required the guidance of white
Christians. Importantly, it also provided white Christians
with a constant source of work yet to be done.
Many slaveholders claimed that anyone who had
spent time around slaves knew that they were an enormous
burden to their masters. Lack of work ethic from slaves was
a popular complaint among slaveholders. Not only did this
perceived laziness offend their idea of the Protestant work
ethic, but it also caused slaveholders to feel that they were
investing more in their slaves than they were getting back.
In his sermon “The Duty of Masters”, Kentucky
Presbyterian minister Rev. John C. Young describes how
he believes the Bible is capable of improving the naturally
inferior characters of slaves. Rev. Young writes,
“The main precept to the servant meets this evil
by enjoining upon him faithfulness and energy
in all that he does: ‘Whatever ye do, do it
heartily.’ And mark the peculiarity of the motive
by which this precept is enforced, and its
adaptation to counteract the force of their
temptation – ‘knowing that of the Lord ye shall
receive the reward of the inheritance.’ Here is
what is needed by the servant – a reward held
out to quicken his sluggish spirit.” 19

As he describes later in the quote the “evil” that Young is
referring to is the sluggish spirit that many slaveholders
18
19

Chesebrough, ed. “God Ordained This War, 148.
Young, “The Duty of Masters”, 40.
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reported as prominent amongst their slaves. Young explains
how the lessons of the Bible can help to improve the
laziness of slaves. Thus men like Young and Meade firmly
believed that slavery was the means through which the
souls of slaves would be saved.
By creating this picture of slaves as in need of
ethical reform proslavery Christians gave themselves a
basis on which to build the rest of their slaveholding ethic.
They also created a way to undermine the accusations of
antislavery evangelicals. In order to combat antislavery
Christian arguments that slaves ought to be freed,
proslavery Christians pointed to what they saw as the
degraded lives of freepersons living in the North. In his
popular work The Religious Instruction of the Negroes in
the United States, Charles C. Jones, a minister, missionary,
and slaveholding planter in Liberty County, Georgia,
discussed what he sees as the debased existence of
freepersons in the Northern states. Jones wrote,
Their physical condition in the slave states, on
the whole, is decidedly in advance of what it is
in the free states. There are more free colored
families in the slave than in the free states: in the
latter the young cannot marry, the support of a
family, especially through the rigors of winter
being difficult; and consequently numbers of
youth, abandon themselves to profligacy. 20

According to proslavery Christians like Rev. Robert
Ryland, “the altruism and recklessness of the North on this
subject” was responsible for the deplorable living

20

Charles C. Jones, The Religious Instruction of the Negroes in the
United States (GA: Thomas Purse, 1842), 121.

12

“Servants, Obey Your Masters”

conditions of blacks in the free states. 21 They believed that
the antislavery emphasis on the equality of all persons was
wholly misguided. Freeing slaves, they believed, would put
responsibilities on them that they could not handle. This of
course would eventually lead to freepersons falling into a
life of vice and moral degeneracy. Therefore antislavery
Christians, in insisting that slaves should be freed, were in
fact doing slaves a disservice by facilitating the damnation
of their souls. Slaves were better off in the care of their
masters who could see to it that they did not go astray and
could afford them the opportunity to correct their
tendencies toward immorality. Rev. Ryland describes the
effect that he believed religious instruction was having on
his black congregation at the First African Baptist Church,
“They have less superstition, less reliance on dreams and
visions, they talk less of the palpable guidings of the spirit
as independent of or opposed to the word of God.” 22 Thus
Rev. Ryland draws once again on the proslavery Christian
depiction of slaves as practitioners of “heathenish”
superstition. Ryland is claiming that the tendency toward
superstition is diminishing within his congregation. Yet by
the very act of invoking a representing of slaves as
“heathenish”, Ryland is bringing to mind that there are
other slaves yet to be saved and much more work for
proslavery Christians to do.
The notion that slaves were better off under the care
of a master hinged on the assumption that all masters were
kind and fatherly toward their slaves, always promoting
their well-being. The real crux of the slaveholding ethic
was its demand that slave owners hold themselves to a high
level of morality and always strive to behave benevolently
21
22

Ryland, Reminiscences of the First African Church, 292.
Ryland, Reminiscences of the First African Church, 265.
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toward their slaves. Slave owners were to give to their
slaves what was due to them according to God. 23 This gave
proslavery Christians the ability to argue that slaveholders,
though they received financial gain from their slaves, were
actually taking on a Christian burden by being
slaveholders. Proslavery publications and sermons of the
period typically started out with the sentiment that slavery
was an enormous burden on the South, one that she would
likely be better off without, but that since Southerners were
now responsible for the slave population it was their
Christian duty to care for them as well as was possible. 24 A
group of ministers from Columbia, South Carolina
described well the idea that slaveholders had a
responsibility to their slaves when they offered a definition
of slavery in an article in The Southern Presbyterian
Review. The ministers wrote,
In return for this service, he is to exercise over
them a just and equal authority, restraining them,
by appropriate rewards and disciplinary
inflictions, from idleness, vice, and immorality.
He is to protect them from wrong and outrage on
the part of others; to nourish them in helpless
infancy and feeble old age; to treat them with
kindness, and to feel towards them the regard to
which they are entitled as servants of his house
and the subjects of his family-government. 25

23

Charles F. Irons, The Origins of Proslavery Christianity: White and
Black Evangelicals in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia (NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 173.
24
Irons, The Origins of Proslavery Christianity, 178.
25
“An Association of Ministers” in Columbia, SC, The Southern
Presbyterian Review Vol. 14 (SC: C.P. Pelham, 1861), 33-34.
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While antislavery opposition remained strong, the
church teachings about the duties of masters were quite
effective in persuading many that slavery, though
distasteful, did not defy God and was therefore not evil. 26
Frederick Law Olmsted was a famous American landscape
architect, journalist, and social critic from Connecticut.27
Olmsted travelled around the Southern United states in
order to gain a first-hand view of slavery and wrote his
observation in a work entitled The Cotton Kingdom: A
Traveler’s Observations on Cotton and Slavery in the
American Slave States. In this work Olmsted describes the
demeanor of a Southern planter with whom he was lodging
toward his slaves. Olmsted writes, “In his own case, at
least, I did not doubt; his manner toward them was paternal
– familiar and kind; and they came to him like children
who have been given some task, and constantly are wanting
to be encouraged and guided, simply and confidently.” 28
Proslavery representations of slaves as child-like contented
beings living under the care of a kind father figure were
effective in combating antislavery representations of slaves
as brutalized, dejected creatures living under the harsh
dictatorship of a Simon Legree.
The years leading up to and during the Civil War
saw a great deal of concern among proslavery Christians
that slaves receive religious instruction. 29 Evangelizing
26
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slaves and instructing them in the teachings of God was one
way to give legitimacy to the entire institution of slavery
which was under heavy attack by abolitionists. Proslavery
ministers, many of them slaveholders themselves,
thundered from the pulpit that though slavery was not evil
or fundamentally wrong, there was one significant problem
with the system: every single proslavery Christian could be
doing more to foster the religious education of slaves.
Though the mission to the slaves was encouraged
by virtually all proslavery Christians, it was perhaps
implemented most zealously in Liberty County, Georgia.
Charles C. Jones, a Presbyterian minister and planter in
Liberty County became the leader of the missionary effort
there. Jones was born to a wealthy planter in Liberty
County and spent some time in the North while attending
Andover seminary in Massachusetts. 30 While at Andover,
Jones experienced some serious doubts about the
righteousness of slavery. Jones was bothered by a system
which held human beings in bondage. He wrote to his
fiancée of his confusion,
I am moreover undecided whether I ought to
hold slaves. As to the principle of slavery, it is
wrong! It is unjust and contrary to nature and
religion to hold men enslaved. But the question
is, in my present circumstances, with the evil of
my hands entailed from my father, would the
general interest of the slaves and community at
large, with reference to the slaves themselves, be
promoted best, by emancipation? Could I do
more for the ultimate good of the slave

30
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population by holding or emancipating what I
own? 31

Despite his reservations about slavery, after
graduating from Andover Jones returned to Liberty County
and became a slaveholding planter like his father. Jones
was always unsure about slavery, and so in an attempt to
both distinguish himself from abolitionists and still take
action that he believed would improve the lives of slaves,
he threw himself into missionary work among the slave
population. 32 Jones was responsible for founding the
“Liberty County Association for the Religious Instruction
of the Negroes” and for persuading other planters and
ministers from Liberty County to join. 33
Jones was surely not the only proslavery
evangelical to hold reservations about the institution of
slavery, but his case does offer an alternative view of the
slaveholding ethic. Other proslavery evangelicals like
Virginia’s Thornton Stringfellow viewed slavery as an evil
in the South which had to be mitigated through a
missionary effort. 34 The institution of slavery was a deeply
engrained part of Southern culture, one that allowed the
Southern aristocracy to maintain their life of leisure and
wealth. Men like Jones and Stringfellow had been
indoctrinated into the institution of slavery since their
births, but nonetheless held a distaste for the institution.35
31
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Many ministers, whether as admissions of personal opinion
or as rhetorical strategy, admitted that slavery was an evil.
Thus slavery existed in an oddly contradictory position: it
was an evil, but one that proslavery Christians nonetheless
fought fiercely to defend.
In his book The Religious Instruction of the Negroes
in the United States Jones set out to explore the religious
and moral condition of slaves. He claimed that the vast
majority of slaves live in a state of moral ignorance and
degradation and were therefore in desperate need of
corrective teaching from ministers and missionaries. 36 He
stressed the importance of the mission to the slaves by
putting forth a representation of them as a class of helpless
persons. Jones insisted, “It is not too much, therefore to say
that the Negroes are in a state of almost absolute
dependence on their owners for the words of eternal life.
They are the most needy of any people in our country.” 37
The idea that slaves needed white Christians in order to
acquire salvation was at the very heart of the slaveholding
ethic.
Even if proslavery Christians could prove that
slavery was being used to accomplish righteous work, they
still had a big problem to get around. Specifically, the
concept that white mediation was necessary for black
salvation contradicted the evangelical belief that salvation
is given freely to anyone who asks for it. Evangelicals
celebrated the liberating nature of their religion because it
moved away from the need for any sort of intercessor in
order to gain forgiveness and salvation. Yet in the
slaveholding ethic that they created they set themselves up
as necessary intercessors for their slaves. Without the built36
37
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in need for white involvement the entire slaveholding ethic
would have come tumbling down. Because proslavery
Christians believed that slaves were more like children than
adults, they created a role for themselves as necessary
guardians and caregivers.
At the heart of the slaveholding ethic was a belief
that people of color were fundamentally different from
white people in a way that rendered them closer to children
than adults. George W. Freeman, a minister in North
Carolina expressed in one of two discourses entitled “The
Rights and Duties of Slaveholders” the belief that slaves
could be thought of as perpetual children. In discussing
slaveholders’ duties to care for the immortal souls of their
slaves Freeman wrote,
Our children, we all feel and acknowledge, have
decided claims of this sort upon us. And in what
respect, brethren, does the relation which we
bear in this matter to our children, differ from
that in which we stand to our slaves? They are
both providentially placed under our protection.
They are equally dependent upon us – especially
subject to our authority – and they alike stand in
need of our help and guidance in the allimportant concern of working out their
salvation. 38

This comparison between children and slaves was
extremely popular and well-versed for explaining why
slavery was beneficial to slaves.
Yet as Freeman goes on to discuss, slaveholders did
recognize some differences between their slaves and their
children. Children eventually grow up, become independent
38
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adults, and leave home. Yet for slaves, “their state of
pupilage never ceases; they are always with us; they are
always members of our families; they are always subject to
our authority and control.” 39 Slaves were to be handled as
children with love and compassion, but it was also
necessary to recognize that they were different from white
children. While the slaveholding ethic insisted on the
importance of maintaining the physical comfort of slaves
by providing adequate food, shelter, and clothing, the
linchpin that held the entire argument together was the
accountability of slaveholders for the religious instruction
and education of their slaves. It was the mission to the
slaves that proslavery Christians believed gave
slaveholding its true value and justifiability.
It was widely claimed that slaves were slow learners
and could only handle simple material. Ministers and
teachers, much like slaveholders, were to exercise patience
and restraint when working with slaves. In his collection of
sermons intended for slaves, Presbyterian minister Rev.
A.F. Dickson offered specific instructions to teachers for
how lessons should be conducted. Dickson wrote,
They are sensitive to cold, to constrained
attitudes, and to distracting influences of every
kind; On the other hand, the subjects to be dwelt
upon are more or less abstract, and therefore
arduous to their awkward minds; and your
language, simple and familiar as it seems to you,
is yet somewhat removed from their colloquial
dialect, and so far forth foreign to them. Then
you need to make the whole business as inviting
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to them as possible. A sullen, discontented
listener is already lost to any hope of benefit.40

Passages like this one from Rev. Dickson illustrate
how deeply white Christians believed they were needed by
their slaves. This idea was essential both to combating
antislavery arguments that slaves ought to be emancipated
as well as to the proslavery understanding of themselves as
performing merciful work.
But this system of special instruction did not come
with expectations solely for teachers and ministers. Slaves
were expected to take the lessons to heart and to implement
them in order to become better, more obedient servants.
This is apparent in the incredible number of sermons
preached by proslavery ministers to black congregations
that emphasized the importance and virtue of obedience.
One such minister, Alexander Glennie, a native of
Scotland, originally came to the United States in order to
tutor a wealthy planter’s son. Though Glennie himself was
a minister in the Protestant Episcopal Church, his books of
plantation sermons were used widely by evangelicals in
their efforts to teach slaves about Christianity. In sermon
four of his Sermons Preached on Plantations to
Congregations of Negroes, Glennie gave a well-worn
lesson about the duty of slaves to be obedient. The passage
offered as justification was a favorite among proslavery
Christians, “Servants, be obedient to them that are your
masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in
singleness of your heart, as unto Christ.”41 Slaves became
extremely familiar with this verse, as nearly all sermons
preached to them by white ministers had something to do
40
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with the theme of obedience. Glennie went on to say in
this sermon,
You are here directed to be obedient to your
master ‘with fear and trembling.’ That is, you
ought to feel so anxious to discharge your duty
faithfully, as to feel afraid of giving offence by
any conduct that looks like disobedience; for, by
disobedience, you not only offend your earthly
master, but you sin against God, and of this
every Christian servant will be afraid. A bad
servant will be afraid only of the punishment he
will receive, if his disobedience should be found
out. But a Christian servant must look up always
to his heavenly master. 42

This passage, and the frequency with which
Ephesians 6:5 was used in sermons preached to black
congregations, is telling of the motives of proslavery
Christians. The focus of slave instruction became molding
slaves into better workers. It is easy to see the selfish
motivation in this, yet nonetheless proslavery Christians
insisted that by making slaves into better workers they were
helping them fulfill God’s purpose for their lives.
Advocates of missionary work to slaves mostly
maintained an attitude of extreme optimism toward the
progress of the cause. One such organization that displayed
this attitude was Charles Jones’ Association for the
Religious Instruction of the Negroes in Liberty County,
Georgia. The Association published yearly reports about
their activities and progress for the year and always had
good news to report. The Association said of the religious
42
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meetings that they encouraged masters to hold for their
slaves “A kind providence has specially smiled upon these
meetings.” 43 The report goes on to provide a section in
which slaveholders in Liberty County wrote in and
responded to a series of questions about the religious
instruction of slaves. Slaveholders were asked if they had
any objection whatsoever to the religious instruction of
slaves, to which every responder replied no. 44 They were
also asked if they had any suggestions for improvement to
which everyone replied that they either had no suggestions
or only suggested that more teachers and missionaries be
provided. 45 Lastly, slaveholders were asked if they had
noticed any change in their slaves, to which every
responder replied that their slaves had become more
obedient, more trustworthy, and all around better
servants. 46 This document demonstrates how careful and
guarded proslavery Christians were in their justifications of
slavery. Organizations like the Association were under a
great deal of pressure to demonstrate success, therefore
they made sure that the picture looked good.
In the years leading up to and during the American
Civil War, evangelical proslavery Christians were aware
that they were under heavy attack from antislavery
Christians. In response proslavery Christians crafted a
deeply paternalistic ethic in which slaveholding was not
only acceptable, but righteous. In a country as steeped in
evangelical Christianity as the United States, the upper
hand would go to whomever could adequately prove that
their cause was supported by the Bible and therefore by
43
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God. The trouble was that both sides were able to provide
evidence that the Bible supported their cause. Therefore
even though most proslavery Christians genuinely believed
in their paternalistic defense of slavery, that paternalism
was always strained because the Bible, the ultimate source
of guidance, could not definitively say one way or another
whether slavery was acceptable. This strain perhaps arose
from the fact that the paternalistic slaveholding ethic,
though proslavery Christians tried desperately to prove
otherwise, contradicted the evangelical belief in free
salvation for every person. Yes, salvation was still available
to slaves, but according to proslavery Christians, the moral
condition of slaves was so degraded that they would never
attain salvation without white mediation. All of this
depended on carefully crafted representations of slaves as
ignorant, incapable, and dependent. Thus it becomes
readily apparent that slaveholding religion, though it
professed to be for the betterment of slaves, was truly for
the benefit of slaveholders. This strain weighed heavily on
men such as Charles Jones and Thornton Stringfellow and
undoubtedly on countless others. In the rhetoric of
proslavery ministers slaves existed in a perpetual childhood
that needed to be directed toward salvation by white
Christians. The fighting on the battlefield was thus being
fueled by another brutal fight taking place in pulpits across
the nation.
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Men and Machines: The Psychological Impact of
Gunboats on the Fort Henry and Donelson Campaign
S. Marianne Johnson
In an age of steam and industry, the ironclad
warship represents the pinnacle of the Industrial
Revolution. Although ironclads had been in existence in
France and Britain in the 1850s, the American Civil War
demonstrated the first time these gunboats were put to use
in ship to ship warfare en masse. 1 Today, ironclads are seen
as one of the great technological achievements of the Civil
War, but their conception and birth were surrounded by
doubts and fears. Despite their intrigue, there has not been
an in-depth study of the psychological effects of these
revolutionary weapons on the men serving in and those
opposing them. The closest study is Gary Joiner’s chapter
on the timberclads Lexington and Tyler at the Battle of
Shiloh.2 The bulk of the primary source material has come
from the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Navies and the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies. Tracing the planning, building, and
deployment of the first gunboats in the Western Gunboat
Flotilla from late 1861 through the Forts Henry and
Donelson campaign in February of 1862 explains how the
ironclads came to be remembered as a symbol of Yankee
power and invincibility.
1
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When Union General Winfield Scott introduced the
Anaconda Plan, a design to isolate the Confederacy and
squeeze it into submission, a crucial part of the plan was to
control the Mississippi River and cut the Confederacy in
half. 3 To do so, the Department of the Navy began to
consider the possibility of ironclad gunboats to conquer and
control the river. The Department sent orders to Captain
John Rodgers on May 16, 1861, sending him to General
George McClellan’s Headquarters at Cincinnati “in regard
to the expediency of establishing a Naval Armament on the
Mississippi and Ohio rivers, or either of them, with a view
of blockading or interdicting communication and
interchanges with the states that are in insurrections.” 4 The
orders went on to state that this operation would be under
the supervision of the Army and that Rodgers would be
subordinate to McClellan. 5 After communicating with
McClellan, Rodgers bought three steamships to be
converted into timberclads, the Conestoga, Lexington, and
A. O. Taylor. 6 Rodgers changed the name Taylor to Tyler
due his personal aversion to President Zachary Taylor,
viewed at the time as a part of the ‘Slave Power
Conspiracy’ for his involvement in the Mexican Cession. 7
Rodgers purchased the ships for the “aggregate” 8 price of
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$62,000 and predicted that at least another $41,000 would
be necessary to strengthen and outfit them for battle.
In addition to timberclads, a contract for ironclad
gunboats, later to be known as city-class ironclads, was
announced. 9 In the summer of 1861, advertisements began
to appear in newspapers across the North encouraging
shipbuilders to submit their proposals for ironclads. The
Boston Daily Advertiser announced on June 3, 1861 that
shipbuilders should submit their proposals to the Navy
Bureau of Construction by June 15. 10 On July 27, The
Daily Picayune in New Orleans reported that plans had
been accepted and the gunboats would be built at
Cincinnati. 11 John Lenthall was the first to try to design the
boats, but abandoned the project because of doubts. After
withdrawing from the project, the task fell to his
subordinate, Samuel Pook. 12
In order to minimize vulnerability, Pook moved the
single paddle wheel into the middle of the ship, inside the
carapace. This provided decent protection at the expense of
maneuverability; turning would be difficult. James
Buchannan Eads won the contract to build seven ironclads
using a layout similar to that of the timberclads based on
Pook’s designs at $89,600 per ship, nearly four times what
Lenthall had originally quoted. 13 In December of 1861, the
9
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Department of the Navy asked Congress for twelve million
dollars for the ironclad program, more than the Navy’s
entire budget for 1860. 14 The Western Flotilla began its
journey as a project with dubious success producing
immense cost for its day.
Despite disputes between the Army and Navy for
who would pay these immense costs, preparations
continued. 15 The gunboats were to be one hundred and
seventy-five feet long and fifty-five feet wide. 16 They
would have a draft of no more than four feet and the
ironclads would be plated with sheets of iron two and a half
inches thick and twelve to twenty-one inches wide joined
with interlocking grooves. 17 The whole project was
expected to be completed in six to eight weeks. However,
constructing the timber and iron warriors would be harder
than first imagined. These gunboats were on the cutting
edge of naval warfare, and new technologies meant trial
and error. The boats were originally contracted to have two
large staterooms for senior officers, ten smaller staterooms
for junior officers, and two eight by ten foot mess decks for
the enlisted men. As work got under way, however, the
contractors quickly realized there simply was not enough
room on the boats to fit everything. Instead of twelve total
staterooms, the Conestoga could only be outfitted with
eight rooms, each six foot square. 18 Problems continued
when it came time to arm the boats. Contractors found
load-bearing beams where guns were supposed to go and
14
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had to find ways of working all the guns in without
compromising the structure. 19 Lt. Seth L. Phelps, who
would eventually command one of the gunships, was
seriously concerned about the work being done; he reported
the joiner work was sloppy and expressed doubts about
their success. 20
Recruiting had been going on since the end of June,
but Rodgers found considerable difficulty in getting men to
enlist. This new project was uncertain from the start; no
one knew yet how effective these boats would be in
repelling enemy fire. Rodgers acknowledged that “the
boilers and engines cannot be defended against cannon
shot. We must take our chances.” 21 No one knew exactly
what would happen if a boiler was hit, and perhaps this
danger kept men from enlisting. 22 As the months went on,
Rodgers desperately requested that Gideon Wells send him
men, but none were to be had. Rodgers was forced to make
do out in the west. 23 The result was that the Western
Gunboat Flotilla was crewed by a peculiar conglomeration
of men who did not fit in anywhere else. Army transfers (or
those who did not perform well in the infantry), rough
riverboat pilots, and eventually former slaves and
contrabands crewed the Mississippi gunboats. 24 The crews
were brash and undisciplined, brawling in the streets, some
even dying of alcohol poisoning before shipping out. 25 Lt.
19
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Phelps again expressed his concern, telling Rodgers that he
was displeased with the quality of the pilots. 26
Uncertainties also arose over the time it took to
complete the ironclads. The date by which the ironclads
were to be completed came and went, and although
unprecedented funds had been spent, it seemed there was
never enough money or time to finally complete them. As
Rodgers grew more and more impatient with the situation
in the Cairo, St. Louis, and Mound City shipyards, Eads
continued to assure him that it was only a matter of time
until the ironclads were in the rivers. Finally, on November
19, 1861, Eads declared the ironclads ready for service. The
names of the six were Mound City, St. Louis, Pittsburg,
Cincinnati, Benton, and Carondelet. 27 In addition to these
six, another vessel, the New Era, was converted to an
ironclad and renamed the Essex. 28
Once completed, the ironclads were anything but
sleek and glamorous weapons of war. Squat and peculiar
looking, they quickly gained the nickname “Pook’s
Turtles” 29 for their resemblance to the animal. Cramped,
noisy, and dirty are words that suited the ironclads well.
The only way to get to the pilot house was through two
round ladders and very small port holes that only “active
men” 30 could fit through. The steam-powered engines
worked around the clock causing constant rattling and
noise. The vessels burned up to six thousand pounds of coal
per day and belched black smoke, covering the vessels with
a thick layer of black grime. 31 Inside the ironclads, average
26
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temperatures hovered around ninety degrees but would
swell above one hundred on hot days, earning them another
nickname, the “federal bake ovens.” 32
The Western Gunboat Flotilla was born amidst a
storm of doubt and obstacle. In August and September of
1861, however, the storm began to abate. The completed
timberclads arrived in Cairo, Illinois on August 16 and
immediately were ordered to “make a demonstration down
the River towards New Madrid.” 33 As the boats began to
operate, newspapers across the North began to sing the
praises of the new gun boats. The North American &
United States Gazette reported on September 26 that the
gunboats were “floating and formidable shape…impervious
to point blank shots—a ball striking them horizontally will
glance off like a hailstone from a steep roof.” 34 Two days
later, the Daily National Intelligencer claimed that a test
shot fired at one hundred yards did no damage to the iron
and that instead, the ball itself broke in pieces. 35 It is
doubtful that a solid shot actually did break into pieces, but
these reports had considerable psychological effects on
soldiers and civilians alike.
Newspapers convinced Northern citizens they had
an impenetrable weapon. They promised that “If the new
gunboats now building near St. Louis, prove to be as
invulnerable as expected, they will be one of the most
effective…in whipping the rebellion. She can’t be sunk,
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burned, nor blown up.” 36 The reporter was referring the
New Era, later renamed the Essex. W.B. Coleman, acting
Paymaster of the Tyler, wrote in late September, “It is
astonishing what a change…has brought about in Public
Opinion in regard to these Gun Boats, they are positively
quoted now as the safety guards…” 37 These praises only
got louder as the boats continued to perform. On November
7, 1861, General Ulysses Grant decided to try to take
Belmont, just across the river from the Confederate
stronghold at Columbus, Kentucky. Belmont proved too
strong, however, and he was forced to withdraw. During
the retreat, the Lexington and Tyler were able to put up a
strong enough cover fire to allow all of Grant’s forces to
evacuate. Both Grant and the naval captains recognized that
the gunboats had served a valuable purpose; had it not been
for the well-directed cover fire, Grant’s men probably
would not have been able to pull out successfully. 38
Belmont impacted Grant profoundly; there he learned the
importance of joint army-navy maneuvers that would
characterize the rest of his fighting in the west. 39
Reports from the gunboat captains took on a more
hopeful tone after Belmont and even more so throughout
December and January of 1861-62. Earlier that fall,
Rodgers was replaced by Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote
for disagreeing with Major General John C. Fremont, but
he left behind the beginnings of a fleet “worth more than
36
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5,000 soldiers.” 40 The western crewmen were performing
well and proving that they could make good artillerymen
after all. Many were impressed by the boats’ ability to
withstand heavy fire. Phelps’ report after the Battle of
Lucas Bend was incredibly positive, reporting inflicting
damage and receiving little in return. 41
As the new gunboats commenced patrolling the
rivers, Confederate horrors were only beginning. The rivers
in the south cut straight to the core of the Confederacy, and
the shallow gunboats were able to penetrate deeply into
enemy territory with relative ease. This caused devastating
psychological effects on Confederate citizens and soldiers
alike. Appearing without warning, the gunboats represented
a piercing type of invasion. Unlike the land armies,
gunboats were incredibly mobile, seeming to materialize
out of thin air and cause absolute terror in Confederate
sympathizers. Images of vile Yankee gunboats preying on
towns of old men and women supported the myth of the
Vandal Yankee and infuriated Southern soldiers who could
not effectively defend against them. 42 The North American
& United States Gazette reproduced a section of the
Richmond Examiner on September 2 expressing relief that
the South had finally started work on their own gunboats to
combat Yankees “prowling through our rivers and hovering
about our harbors.” 43 Commander Strembel of the
40
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Cincinnati claimed that two shots from the ironclad sent
Confederate troops fleeing eight miles from the river. 44
The Mississippi Gunboat Flotilla entered the Fort
Henry and Donelson campaign as a weapon of terror.
Although they had not yet fought a significant battle, both
sides believed the ironclads to be impenetrable and
undefeatable. For the North, this caused joy and
confidence; for the South, fear and helplessness reigned. By
early 1862, Grant had decided to attempt joint maneuvers
to push up the Tennessee River and attained permission
from Major General Henry Halleck to do so on February 1,
1862. Halleck, unsure of the success of such a mission,
carefully crafted his orders so that if the mission should
fail, all of the blame would fall on Grant. 45
Nevertheless, Grant moved forward with his plans.
Fort Henry sat low on the Tennessee River in a poorly
chosen spot. It did not help matters any that in his frenzied
attempt to turn Columbus into the ‘Gibraltar’ of the West,
Major General Leonidas Polk had diverted resources for the
fort’s defense to Columbus. The result was an unfinished
and sloppily built fort that could be enfiladed by three or
four points on the opposite shore. 46 Manned by 2,610 men,
only a third of which were disciplined and properly trained,
the fort was in bad shape by early 1862. 47 Most of the men
were armed with shotguns and hunting rifles, and one of
the better armed regiments, the 10th Tennessee, was using
“Tower of London” flintlock muskets that had last seen
action in the War of 1812. 48 As early as February 4,
44

ORN 22: 300.
Joiner, Brownwater Navy, 39.
46
ORN 22:556.
47
ORN 22:557.
48
Jesse Taylor, “Memoir of Jesse Taylor”, in The Civil War Series
Volume 1: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (New York: Century
45

37

Johnson

soldiers inside the fort could see “as far as the eye could
see, the course of the river could be traced by the dense
volumes of smoke issuing from the flotilla.” 49 The soldiers
in the fort knew attack was imminent.
In early February, 1862, Grant issued Field Orders
No. 1 outlining the plan for the attack. The first division
under Major General John McClernand was to occupy the
road between Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, twelve miles
away on the Cumberland River, to cut off the escape route
and prevent reinforcements to Fort Henry. Meanwhile, two
brigades under Major General C. F. Smith were to move up
the west bank of the Tennessee while the Third Brigade,
Second Division advanced up the east bank. One company
of the Second Division was detailed to Flag Officer Foote
to serve as sharpshooters on the gunboats, who would
approach the fort straight on and engage. 50
At 10:20pm on February 6, the ironclads
Cincinnati, Carondelet, St. Louis, and Essex approached
Fort Henry four abreast. Behind them, the three timberclad
gunboats formed a second line. Fire opened at 1,700 yards
and steadily advanced to within 600 yards. 51 Within the
fort, Confederate General Lloyd Tilghman knew his force
could not drive back the gunboats and made the choice to
send most of his force to Fort Donelson, a much more
defendable position. Tilghman retained only the heavy
artillery to perform delay tactics until the bulk of his force
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49
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could reach Donelson. In his after-action report, Tilghman
estimated that the enemy gunboats had about fifty-four
guns as opposed to the eleven in the fort. 52 Tilghman
managed to hold on until approximately 2:00 p.m. 53
Tilghman’s report rings with language of
desperation and hopelessness. After sending the bulk of his
force to Donelson, Tilghman was faced with the choice of
leaving his men or staying with them. Ultimately, he
recognized what a psychological blow it would be to his
men to abandon them. He decided to fight and stay,
although his language makes clear that he had no hope of
successfully fending off the ironclads. First, his twenty-four
pounder gun exploded, killing or disabling every man at the
piece. Next, the vent of his ten-inch Columbiad clogged
and refused to reopen. One by one, he recorded the loss of
each gun with growing anxiety. After firing for close to
three hours, his men were exhausted. General Tilghman
himself stepped in for an exhausted gunner at one of the
thirty-two pounders. 54
Reading Tilghman’s report leaves the one with the
impression even the best gunmen the Confederacy could
not oppose Yankee technology. Even if this is not accurate,
the report is still a fascinating example of the Confederate
dread of ironclads. One observer commented on the
devastating effect the ironclads had on Confederate
soldiers’ morale: “Our artillerists became very much
discouraged when they saw the two heavy guns disabled,
the enemy’s boats apparently uninjured and still drawing
nearer and nearer. Some of them even ceased to work the
32-pounder guns, under the belief that such shot were too
52
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light to produce any effect upon the ironclad sides of the
enemy’s boats.” 55 After the fort had surrendered, a captured
Confederate gunner told a Federal sailor the Carondelet
was the object of hatred and frustration among the gunners
who, despite their well-aimed fire, could not disable her. 56
These incidents give the reader an image nearing futility;
despite well-aimed Confederate fire, the ironclads just kept
coming. Confederate accounts reveal the classic man versus
machine dichotomy and give insight into the deeper
psychological issues surrounding ironclads.
All told, the ironclads survived their baptism of fire
quite well. The Carondelet and the St. Louis took six and
seven hits respectively but reported no casualties. The
Cincinnati took thirty one hits but reported only one killed
and nine wounded. The Essex took fifteen hits, the last one
piercing the boiler. 57 In addition to the Confederate
soldiers, the psychological impact of the gunboats on the
Federal sailors who served in them cannot be overlooked.
Believing the newspapers, many gunboatmen went into
battle with a false sense of safety because they believed
their gunboats were impenetrable. 58 However, they were
quickly disabused of these notions. Before an engagement,
buckets of water and sand would be brought up to the deck.
The water was for men to drink during combat; the sand
was to absorb the blood. Seeing the sand forced men to
confront their fears and the possibility of their injuries or
deaths. 59 The combination of smoke from the engines and
guns resulted in smoke so dark and thick that sometimes a
man could not see the man working the gun next to him.
55
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The darkness and almost suffocating effect of the smoke
was disorienting and made men vulnerable to panic and the
heat was so intense often men would strip to the waist and
sweat so profusely they related it to rain. 60
Unlike a land battlefield, inside an ironclad, there
was nowhere to go to escape the carnage short of jumping
into the river. The plating on the gunboats negated the
impact of musket fire; instead, men saw the impact of large
guns, ripping holes and sending splinters of wood and other
debris into the crew and inflicting horrifying, gaping
wounds. Men fought amidst the blood, limbs, and all other
horrors that covered the decks. 61 For Federal gunboatmen,
combat became a waiting game. Some men found
themselves counting the number of times shots hit certain
areas of the boat, waiting for one to penetrate. 62 Although
safe for a moment, at any time a shot could hit just the right
spot and turn the boat into a floating death trap.
The Essex exemplifies how one well-placed shot
could turn a gunboat into a nightmare. The officers and
designers knew the gunboats were weak around the boilers
and engines, but there was little that could be done. 63 The
worst sound that could be heard on a gunboat in the
Mississippi River was the sound of a shot hitting the boiler,
a sharp crack followed by an intense rushing sound as
scalding hot steam exploded in every direction. Steam from
a boiler seared and boiled flesh and could even knock out
teeth. 64 When the shot entered the Essex, it decapitated
Acting Master’s Mate S. B. Brittan before striking the
boiler. Both pilots were immediately scalded to death and
60
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almost thirty men were soon after “writhing in agony” 65 on
the deck. Only about half of the wounded would recover. 66
Captain Porter dove through a gun port to escape the steam
and was caught by Seaman John Walker, who held onto
him with one arm and the boat with the other until help
arrived. 67 The men on the Essex saw comrades literally
boiled to death and from inside the fort Confederate
Captain Jesse Taylor could see men throwing themselves
“wildly” into the water to escape the steam. 68
After the fort fell, the timberclads Lexington and
Conestoga were sent upriver to pursue any Confederate
vessels they came across. They overcame eight Confederate
vessels whose crews were forced to set them on fire before
they could be captured by Union sailors. Included in the
destruction was a load of iron destined for the Tredgar Iron
Works and the destruction of over $100,000 of Confederate
government property. At Florence and Tuscumbia, Federal
troops broke into Confederate government warehouses and
helped themselves to provisions but left civilian property
alone. 69 Southern sympathizers reacted to the loss in horror.
The new Federal gunboats seemed invincible. The fight
was relayed by the Daily Columbus Enquirer as an almost
completely one-sided affair. “The fall of the first-named
fort[Henry], we have no doubt, is due to the superiority of
the guns of the Yankees—their gunboats, we presume,
standing off, as at Hatteras, beyond the effective range of
65
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the guns of the fort, and at this safe distance pouring into it
a fire which ultimately compelled its surrender or
evacuation.” 70 John Beauchamp Jones, a Confederate clerk,
spun the invasion upriver as an attack on helpless,
despairing women. As the boats continued their upriver
raid, Confederates became terrified that the gunboats would
be able to get into Alabama and Mississippi. 71
For others, however, the gunboats had an interesting
way of sorting out sympathies. Captain Phelps reported
Unionists suddenly appearing on the river banks, telling
stories of forced conscription, appealing to the gunboats as
their liberators and begging them to stay. Often, the sight of
gunboats would embolden Unionist citizens to unmask
their sympathies, tearing apart the notion of the solid South.
Phelps also reported that at least twenty-five young men
clambered to the ironclads to enlist in the Union Army. 72
Once the gunboats departed, however, many of those same
citizens hid those convictions because the gunboats were no
longer there to protect them. 73 The morale boost in the
North was astounding. Flag Officer Foote was praised for
his action and when the Cincinnati steamed into Cairo with
Fort Henry’s Stars and Bars flying upside down under the
United States flag, the city erupted into joyous cheering. 74
Some declared that the war would soon be over, but Flag
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Officer Foote mourned the losses on the Essex and vowed
that “never again will I go into a fight half-prepared.” 75
The victory at Fort Henry was much more important
for its psychological effect than for its actual military
achievements. Although at first glance it appears that the
ironclads were able to pull off a stunning, single-handed
victory, two key factors worked hugely to their advantage.
First, the horrible positioning of the fort beneath the water
line resulted in flooding and allowed the ironclads to pour
direct fire into it. Secondly, the bulk force of the garrison
had already been sent ahead to Fort Donelson and only a
skeleton force remained behind to cover the retreat. These
factors produced a skewed vision of the ironclads as
invincible weapons of war. 76 The Macon Daily Telegraph
glumly reported on the hard losses of the fort and the
timberclad raid, misreporting that there was only one
Federal casualty from the battle. 77
The same newspaper, however, sought to minimize
fear of the ironclads. One week after reporting on the hard
losses, the Macon Daily Telegraph ran an article titled
“Federal Gunboats Not Invulnerable.” The article
misreported that the Confederates had been able to inflict
one hundred Federal casualties and assured its readers that
at least two shots had been able to penetrate the iron on the
Essex and the Cincinnati. The article went on to predict that
if the ironclads were to attack a better equipped, stronger
fort, the outcome would be different. 78 The article ran on
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February 19, two days after Fort Donelson fell, but
Donelson is never mentioned in the article and the
prediction seems almost prophetic.
Meanwhile, preparations were being made inside
Fort Donelson for the coming attack. Reporting on the state
of Donelson’s defenses, Chief Engineer Lt. Colonel Gilmer
felt confident in the fort’s ability to withstand a land attack
but remained concerned about the gunboats. 79 Brigadier
General John Floyd, the commander officer of the fort,
echoed similar sentiments. Floyd betrayed his anxiety,
saying, “If the best information I can gather about these
iron-clad boats be true they are nearly invulnerable, and
therefore they can probably go wherever sufficient fuel and
depth of water can be found, unless met by opposing
gunboats.” 80 Instead of waiting for orders, Grant
capitalized on the opportunity and started immediately for
Fort Donelson. Because the ironclads had performed so
well at Fort Henry, Grant allowed them to attack without
infantry support. 81 This would prove to be a mistake.
Donelson was much better outfitted, manned by about
thirteen thousand troops, and sat on one hundred and
twenty foot bluffs, starkly different from the lowlands of
Fort Henry. 82 On February 14, the ironclad assault was to
begin in earnest. This was not the same fleet that had taken
on Fort Henry; both the Essex and the Cincinnati were out
for repairs. This time, the Louisville and the Pittsburg
would join the Carondelet and the St. Louis along with the
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timberclads Tyler and Conestoga. 83 Foote himself was still
not confident after the Essex boiler explosion and did not
feel the Flotilla was ready to go into action again. Grant,
however, disagreed, confident in their ability to deliver him
another quick victory. 84 The night before the assault, the
two men met to discuss their disagreement. Although much
of the conversation has been lost, Grant emerged cheerful
and sure of his impending victory. 85
On the morning of the assault, Grant and his staff
assembled to watch the spectacular ironclads at work.
Freezing rain and snow had reduced visibility to only a few
yards. 86 In order to prevent another Essex, the crew of the
Pittsburg had stacked bags of coal, hammocks, and any
other materials they could find around the boiler to protect
it from direct fire. 87As the ironclads steamed up to the fort
with the timberclads in support, Confederate gunners
managed to hold their fire until the ironclads got within a
range of about four hundred yards and let loose a hail of
fire simultaneously. 88 Very quickly, chaos broke out as the
Carondelet started the assault by sending harassing fire into
the water batteries.
Instead of demolishing the batteries, the
Confederate gunners were instead able to inflict serious
damage to the point where some believed they had sunk
Carondelet after she drifted downriver. 89 The Carondelet
had one of its rifled guns explode and was struck in the
83

ORN, 22:585; James Hamilton, The Battle of Fort Donelson (New
York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1968), 132-133.
84
Grant, Personal Memoirs, 302.
85
Cooling, Forts Henry and Donelson, 153.
86
ORA 1, 7:174.
87
ORN 22:592.
88
ORN 22:606.
89
ORA, 1, 7: 281.

46

Men and Machines

wheelhouse, jamming the wheel and rendering the ironclad
useless as she floated back down the river in need of
extensive repairs. 90 The official after action battle reported
also noted that the Pittsburg had struck off his starboard
rudder and the Tyler accidentally hit his casemate with a
shell. The Carondelet reported no injuries after Henry, but
after Donelson the crew had suffered forty-six wounded
and four killed. 91
The St. Louis also suffered, taking a shot through
the pilothouse that penetrated one and a half inches of iron
and more than fifteen inches of oak timber. 92 Splinters from
the timber wounded several, including Flag Officer Foote,
who suffered an injury to the ankle. 93 As the ironclads got
closer, the fort’s batteries were able to fire directly onto
their decks. Iron-plating on the decks was not very thick
and the gunboats were mauled as shots penetrated the deck
and wreaked havoc below. After only ninety minutes of
firing, the ironclads were forced to retreat. The Carondelet
alone sent one hundred and thirty-nine shells into the fort
with minimal damage. Not a single Confederate gun in the
fort was disabled and not one casualty was reported. 94
The morale of the Confederate soldiers soared.
After blowing off the smokestack of the St. Louis, one
Rebel gunner reportedly shrieked out, “Come on, you
cowardly scoundrels, you are not at Fort Henry!”95
Brigadier General Gideon Pillow sent joyous telegrams
declaring their success in the “fiercest fight on record” with
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the ironclads. 96 A portion of the diary of Captain R.R.
Ross, a commander of one of the shore batteries,
reproduced in the Confederate Veteran in 1896, wrote that
driving back the ironclads was in itself a great victory. Ross
made it a point to show that the ironclads had failed and
been soundly defeated. 97
The failure of the ironclads disappointed Grant, who
wrote in his memoirs that though at first the enemy had
been demoralized by the assault, after seeing them driven
off, their “jubilant” response made him sad. He planned to
pull back and entrench until the flotilla could get the
necessary repairs in Cairo. 98 General Floyd, however, had
different ideas. On the night of the 14th, Floyd attempted a
desperate breakout attempt, hitting the Union right. The
Federals were able to hold their line but at the loss of an
estimated 1,200 casualties. The next day, Grant ordered
Major General C. F. Smith’s Division to charge the
enemy’s right and then ordered a second assault by Major
Generals John McClernand and Lew Wallace to commence
on the enemy’s left. 99
After the catastrophe of the ironclad assault, a
demoralized and injured Foote had regrouped his flotilla
downriver and was ready to drift back to Cairo for repairs.
Grant, however, ordered any gunboats able should return to
the fort and fire shells at a distance. Grant wrote that if the
gunboats simply made an appearance during McClernand
and Wallace’s attack, their presence alone could shift
morale, save the reputation of the ironclads, and secure
victory. When Commander Benjamin Dove, temporarily in
96
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command since Foote’s injury, received the message, he
perceived its importance and immediately took the St.
Louis, the only ironclad left in an operable condition and
returned to fire on the fort. 100 That night, Brigadier General
John Floyd, Pillow, and Nathan Bedford Forrest all broke
out of the fort to avoid capture, leaving Simon Bolivar
Buckner to surrender and sent a message to Grant
requesting certain terms. 101 Grant, however, replied with
the now-famous phrase, “no terms except an unconditional
and immediate surrender can be accepted,” forever earning
himself the nickname “Unconditional Surrender Grant.” 102
The descriptions of the ironclads after the Fort
Henry and Donelson Campaign are perhaps the most
interesting of all the documents analyzed. On paper, the
ironclads were embarrassed, destroyed, proven to be
vulnerable and able to be beaten. That, however, is not the
story that emerged from the aftermath reports and
recollections. Instead, if anything, the reputation of the
ironclads only became more invincible as time passed and
memories began to form. General Lew Wallace later
recollected after receiving devastating news that all of the
ironclads had been disabled, he was overjoyed to hear the
sound of their guns just as his men were about to assault the
Rebel line. Wallace said, “While my division was engaged,
the guns of the fleet opened fire again. I recollect yet the
positive pleasure the sounds gave me. I recollect thinking,
too, of the obstinacy and courage of the commodore, and
how well timed his attack was, if, as I made no doubt, it
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was made to assist General Smith and myself…”103
Returning to fire saved the “reputation for invincibility in
the minds of both the national and rebel armies.” 104
In these statements, Wallace helped to create and
essential myth to the legacy of the Western Gunboat
Flotilla. The Fort Henry and Donelson campaign is not
remembered as a thrashing of the ironclads but instead as
the triumph of Grant’s audacity and cutting edge
technology. John Milligan has made the point that although
Donelson proved the ironclads were not invincible, it did
not matter; the psychological damage had already been
done and the myth had been created. 105 In his Memoirs of
Service Afloat, Ralph Semmes treated the events of
February 1862 as a foregone conclusion, writing: “When
the enemy, by means of his gunboats, could send armies up
the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, to the heart of
Tennessee and Alabama, it was folly to think of holding
Bowling Green, with our limited forces.” 106
Analyzing the Western Gunboat Flotilla’s
performance and legacy during the Fort Henry and
Donelson campaign yields interesting insight into both
Union and Confederate reactions to the advent of ironclad
warfare. Born out of uncertainty and doubt, the ironclads
became a symbol of the invincibility of Yankee industry,
even when that notion was proven false at Fort Donelson.
Gunboat technology was still in its infancy in the early days
of 1862 and yet, despite the trial and error, the ironclads
loomed larger than life. For some, such as Lew Wallace’s
infantrymen, this symbol produced inspiration and pride.
103
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For others, such as John Beauchamp Jones and Ralph
Semmes, the ironclads came to represent industrialized
Yankee villainy. The thrills and fears the ironclads on the
Fort Henry and Donelson campaign inspired are far more
essential to the understanding of ironclad legacy and
memory today than their actual performance in the field.
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The Memory of Battle Surrounds You Once Again:
Iowa Grand Army of the Republic Reunions and the
Formation of a Pro-Union Nationalism, 1886-1949
Peter Bautz
Five years after the Civil War ended, Secretary of
War William Belknap delivered a keynote address before a
group of veterans at the 1870 Reunion of the Iowa
Department of the Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R.).
A former Major General in the Union Army and a fellow
Iowan, he began his address by invoking the memory of the
war that had recently ended: “In the joyous satisfaction of a
Union rescued and under the control of peace, you are, in
imagination, my brothers, in the midst of an Army of which
you were a part. You are among memories which no
influences can now dispel.” Belknap then spoke about
memories of muskets firing, friends falling, and the triumph
of patriotism. He memorialized valorous Iowans who had
given their last for their country and reminded the living to
honor their sacrifice as Lincoln had asked in the Gettysburg
Address. 1
Belknap concluded his address with another strong
reminder about the role of Civil War memory in American
society. He told the veterans, “History will tell of the deeds
of those days. Artists will sketch in colors the memorable
actions which will to all ages illustrate the art and science
of war. Songs will recount the heroic labors of the Union’s
brave; but soon of those whom the Nation honored there
will be only a memory left.” He then reminded veterans
1

William Belknap, “Address of General Wm. W. Belknap Secretary of
War at the Re-union of Iowa Soldiers, Des Moines, Iowa,” August 31,
1870, 3-4.
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that the duty of reminding the nation about what memory
should be preserved would fall to them as they aged: “[The
memory of the war], though, will still endure, and as the
last actors in those scenes, with trembling limbs and
silvered locks, are singled out as survivors of a patriotic
Army … children will hasten to gather around them as they
tell the stories of the days of the great rebellion.” Belknap
had, in short, instructed the Union veterans before him to
pass their memories on to the next generation and to ensure
that the patriotic, Union version of the war was not lost. 2
Speeches like Belknap’s illustrate how powerful
veterans were in shaping the memory of the Civil War.
Veteran societies, like the G.A.R. and the United
Confederate Veterans (U.C.V.), and their reunions
buttressed and emboldened their respective section’s
national myth. Public memory has become an increasingly
important area of research for historians, who have begun
to recognize that the creation of memory is often just as
important as the events that the memory seeks to enshrine. 3
Undervalued in much of the recent public memory work by
historians of the Civil War has been the impact Union
veterans had in shaping a pro-Union nationalism. Many
historians, like Caroline Janney and John Neff, have found
it difficult to pin down exactly what the pro-Union
nationalism was. Janney views the nationalism as a
2

William Belknap, “Address of General Wm. W. Belknap Secretary of
War at the Re-union of Iowa Soldiers, Des Moines, Iowa,” August 31,
1870, 14-16.
3
Some examples from historians include: David Blight, Race and
Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2001); Caroline Janney, Remembering the Civil War:
Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2013); Sarah Purcell, Sealed With Blood: War,
Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002).

56

The Memory of Battle

reconciliatory, umbrella one which everyone from
suffragettes to imperialists could get behind. 4 These
definitions of a pro-Union nationalism have been
unsatisfying at best. But perhaps this difficulty can be
explained by the fact that most historians have insisted on
treating the North as one monolithic group. Most works on
Northern memory include veterans’ memories as part of
their study but fail to separate them from politicians and
home front memories of the war.
Separating out veterans as a select sub-category of
the Northern population allows a deeper look at what
veterans thought about the war in its aftermath. It becomes
clear when considered separately that veterans created and
maintained a distinctly pro-Union nationalism which
undercut Lost Cause claims, reminded the nation that the
Union fought for the right cause and the Confederacy
fought for the wrong cause, and argued for the
remembrance of Union sacrifices but not Confederate
sacrifice. These themes crop up in many states around the
country, including Iowa. In particular, publications of the
Iowa Department of the G.A.R. from its founding in 1868
to its dissolution in 1949 provide an excellent case study of
how reunions played a major role in forming a pro-Union
national identity.
The Grand Army of the Republic
In 1866, Major Benjamin Franklin Stephenson and
Chaplain William Rutledge founded the G.A.R. in Illinois.
From there, the G.A.R. grew from a small group into a
large national organization which became a breeding
4

Janney, Remembering the Civil War, 8-11. John Neff, Honoring the
Civil War Dead: Commemoration and the Problem of Reconciliation
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 1-15.
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ground for pro-Union nationalism. From its inception, the
G.A.R. earned the reputation of a bloody-shirt-waving,
Republican partisan organization for Union veterans. 5 Low
participation rates among veterans forced the G.A.R. to
undergo a transformation into a fraternal order dedicated to
a three word motto: “fraternity,” “charity,” “loyalty.” 6 The
new G.A.R. gathered a large number of veterans to the
organization and by the 1880s could claim over 400,000
Union veterans among its ranks. 7 The late 1880s also saw
another shift in the G.A.R. as it became one of two Civil
War veterans’ associations. The rise of the U.C.V. in the
South at the end of the nineteenth century began the
dissemination of the Lost Cause in opposition to the proUnion nationalism espoused by the G.A.R. 8 While
5

State Historical Society of Iowa, The Iowa Department of the Grand
Army of the Republic (Iowa City: Athens Press, 1936), 18-19.
6
Stuart McConnell, Glorious Contentment: The Grand Army of the
Republic, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1992), xiii-xiv.
7
State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa Department of the G.A.R., 2024. In this case, “ranks” is both figurative and literal. The G.A.R. was
arranged in a quasi-military structure with a Commander-in-Chief,
Department Heads, Quartermasters, etc.
8
The U.C.V. was not the creator of the Lost Cause but the organization
did help to make the Lost Cause a mainstream notion in the South.
Foster Gaines notes that the Lost Cause was based on tropes: “states’
rights,” “white supremacy,” “[defending Southern] actions in 18611865,” and “[insisting] that the North acknowledge the honor and
heroism of [the Southern] cause.” This was often a far cry from the
Union nationalism found in the G.A.R. For more, see: Keith Bohannon,
“’These Few Gray-Haired, Battle-Scarred Veterans’: Confederate
Army Reunions in Georgia, 1885-95,” in The Myth of the Lost Cause
and Civil War History, edited by Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000): 89-110; Gaines Foster,
Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence
of the New South 1865-1913 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1987), 3-8; Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory (New York:
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continuing to bolster a pro-Union nationalism, the G.A.R.
campaigned heavily for pension reforms and Republican
political candidates. In fact, it was often thought that,
through the end of the nineteenth century, a Republican
candidate could not secure the party nomination for
president without G.A.R. support. 9
However, the G.A.R. provided more than simply
political support and a voice in government for its
members. G.A.R. departments were divided into posts,
serving towns and cities of various sizes. At post buildings,
veterans would gather to talk about politics, war memories,
and anything else that might be in vogue. 10 The G.A.R. also
sponsored numerous reunions at the national, state, and
local levels. These annual reunions were called
“encampments” and normally involved veterans gathering
to remember the war and discuss army memories with their
fellow veterans over the course of a few days.
Encampments involved a day of formal, official meetings
and informal campfires at night. Campfires involved
singing songs, reciting poetry, and listening to informal
speeches – in other words, the perfect environment to
facilitate the development of nationalism. 11
The Iowa G.A.R. was a particularly well organized
state department of the G.A.R. and was active at the
national level as well. The Iowa Department kept some of
the best records of their reunions and was one of the largest
Alfred A. Knopf, 1991); Robert E. Lee, “General Order No. 9,” April
10, 1865.
9
State Historical Society of Iowa, The Iowa Department of the Grand
Army of the Republic (Iowa City: Athens Press, 1936), 20-24.
10
McConnell, Glorious Contentment, xiii-xiv.
11
Iowa Grand Army of the Republic, Journal of the Forty-third Annual
Encampment Department of Iowa Grand Army of the Republic at
Davenport (Des Moines: J. H. Welch Printing Co., 1917).
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and best organized G.A.R. state departments. Iowa
provided three Commanders-in-Chief of the G.A.R. and
was prominent at many reunions. Founded in 1868, the
Iowa Department was the third G.A.R. department to be
formed, and many national G.A.R. reunions were held in
the state. 12 In short, Iowa was a major participant at all
levels of G.A.R. reunions.
The Memory Debate and Imagining Communities
Scholars of Civil War memory have worked to
formulate an idea of how Americans created imagined
communities in the aftermath of the Civil War via shared
experiences. David Blight argues that Confederate and
Union veterans came together over a shared whiteness,
forgetting about slavery as a cause of the Civil War in favor
of a more neutral memory of soldiers’ valorous sacrifice. 13
Christopher Waldrep, likewise, argues that the North
capitulated to Southern racial views, using the Blue-Grey
reunion at Vicksburg in 1917 as a case study. 14 Some
scholars have sought to chip away at this reconciliationist
position. John Neff argues that Union memorial services
and memorials helped solidify a pro-Union nationalism
rather than a capitulation to the Lost Cause. 15 Barbara
Gannon emphasizes black integration in the G.A.R., which
was much more widespread than previously thought, as a
primary conduit for the formation of a pro-Union

12

State Historical Society of Iowa, The Iowa Department of the Grand
Army of the Republic (Iowa City: Athens Press, 1936), 28-30.
13
Blight, Race and Reunion, 3-5.
14
Christopher Waldrep, Vicksburg’s Long Shadow: The Civil War
Legacy of Race and Remembrance (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 2005), 1-5.
15
Neff, Honoring the Civil War Dead, 1-15.
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nationalism. 16 Caroline Janney directly pushes back against
Blight and argues that the North never forgot that the Civil
War was fought to free the slaves and that these veterans
were developing a pro-America nationalism. 17 In sum,
there is an ongoing debate in the historical community
regarding how much the North capitulated to the South
over issues of memory.
All these scholars share one thing in common: a
focus on memory and the development of nationalism.
Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” framework
for nationalism provides a useful tool in this case study for
understanding how Iowa veterans were creating a proUnion nationalism. Anderson defines a nation as imagined
because “members … will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in
the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”18
He recognizes shared songs, poems, and printed works as
key to developing the imagined communities – they are the
tools by which people imagine what their fellows must be
like. All of these types of community-building activities
occurred at reunions, making the “imagined communities”
framework highly useful in evaluating Iowa G.A.R.
reunions.
Another common element to these scholars’ work is
their treatment of the early years of the G.A.R.. None of
these scholars contest the idea that the G.A.R. was a
partisan Republican, pro-Union group in its early years. 19
16

Barbara Gannon, The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in
the Grand Army of the Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2011), 1-11.
17
Janney, Remembering the Civil War, 3-11.
18
Ibid., 6.
19
See for instance, Blight, Race and Reunion, 141-142, where Blight
describes the fierce partisanship which he argues “gave way” to the
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Disagreement over the level of reconciliation only arises in
when historians consider the era after the Lost Cause
emerged in the mid-1880s. For this reason, this study
focuses on the years 1886-1949 for this study.
The Peak Years of the G.A.R.: 1886-1913
By the end of the nineteenth century, the G.A.R.
had become a vast organization with hundreds of thousands
of members. These members retained Republican
allegiances and were responsible for getting numerous
Republican candidates elected to office. 20 As its members
aged, it became a powerhouse for securing pensions for
Union veterans and establishing Soldiers’ Homes for poor
veterans. 21 G.A.R. national encampments and national
campfires became larger and the memories created at these
events reached wider audiences as the G.A.R. became
better organized and published more literature for its
members. 22 Here, too, Iowa mirrored larger trends in the
G.A.R. as Iowa veterans helped get Republican governors,
senators, and representatives elected. They voted for
Republican presidential nominees. The Iowa encampment
journals became longer and contained better notes, and
Iowa encampments became bigger. 23
The songs, poems, and speeches at Iowa G.A.R.
reunions from 1886 to 1913 demonstrate that sectionalism
reconciliation of the late 1880s onwards. The Iowa G.A.R. was just as
partisan as the national G.A.R. during its early years, if not more so.
20
McConnell, Glorious Contentment, xiv-xvi.
21
Ibid., xiv-xvi. State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa Department of
the Grand Army of the Republic, 23, 37-38.
22
State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa Department of the Grand
Army of the Republic, 23, 37-38.
23
Ibid., 35-40. Given the context of the definition, “perpetrate” was
likely a phonetic (mis)spelling of “perpetuate.” As it is, perpetrating a
memory the organization cherished makes no sense.
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was very much alive well into the twentieth century. When
the Torrence G.A.R. Post in Keokuk, Iowa, adopted a new
set of by-laws in 1891 at their annual post reunion, they
included an introductory section in which they defined the
three watchwords of the G.A.R.: “fraternity,” “charity,”
“loyalty.” 24 However, it is apparent that fraternity did not
mean fraternity for all veterans of the Civil War. They
defined fraternity as bringing together the men who “united
to suppress the late rebellion” and to “perpetrate [sic] the
memory and history of the dead.” 25 This is hardly a
definition of reconciliation. Instead, these Iowa veterans
established a fraternal club that excluded ex-Confederates.
The most interesting definition they gave, though, was of
“loyalty”:
To maintain true allegiance to the United States
of America, based upon a paramount respect for,
and fidelity to, the National Constitution and
Laws, to discountenance whatever tends to
weaken loyalty, incites to insurrection, treason
or rebellion, or in any manner impairs the
efficiency and permanency of our free
institutions. 26

Notably, the G.A.R. veterans chose to emphasize their
position against treason and rebellion – two terms that were
frequently used to describe Confederates even after the war
by these veterans. They also chose to emphasize how they
would protect their free (i.e. not slave) institutions. These
24

By Laws and Roster of Torrence Post No. 2 Grand Army of the
Republic Department of Iowa (Keokuk: No Publisher Listed, 1891), 23.
25
Ibid., 3.
26
By Laws and Roster of Torrence Post No. 2. Emphasis mine.
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lines do not sound like those of an organization dedicated
to “reconciliation and fraternalism” with their exConfederate counterparts. 27
Iowa G.A.R. members went beyond simply invoking
sectionalist definitions of their organization at reunions,
though. They also read poems with a definite pro-Union,
anti-Confederacy message. At the second reunion of the
35th Iowa Infantry in 1889, Blair Wolf of Company G rose
to recite a poem he had written for the occasion. He
reminded his audience that when “foul rebellion arose in
the land / … / The Northland stood firm in upholding the
laws.” 28 He argued that the Union had “stood up for
justice” and “fought for the truth.” 29 This recitation was
“heartily received” with a “storm of applause” according to
the report of the reunion. 30 This type of poem fits well
within the model Anderson presents in Imagined
Communities. Wolf invoked the plural “we” to describe his
fellow Union veterans and reminded them of the cause for
which they had fought – national unity. The lines of this
poem celebrate a heroic memory inseparable from the proUnion cause. 31 These poems were ways for veterans to
partake in a shared memory of the war and to reaffirm their
pro-Union nationalism.
27

Blight, Race and Reunion, 198.
Blair Wolf, “Untitled Poem,” in First and Second Re-unions of the
Thirty-Fifth Iowa Infantry Held at Muscatine, Iowa (Muscatine: 1890),
34. It is possible that this was John Wolf, who also served in the ThirtyFifth Iowa. Both men were present at the reunion, and after a person
spoke for the first time his name was recorded from then on as their last
name preceded by the title “Comrade,” which was the title of choice for
fellow G.A.R. members. Context suggests that the speaker here was
Blair Wolf.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., 35.
31
Anderson, Imagined Communities, 146.
28
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Poems such as these continued to be publicly
recited at G.A.R. reunions well into the twentieth century.
At the 1913 Department of Iowa encampment, Henry Field
of Gordon Granger Post 64 in Grinnell rose to recite a
poem about the service rendered by Union veterans written
by a friend who was unable to make the reunion. The poem
invoked themes of patriotism and loyalty and urged
veterans to recall how they had fought to see “That the
wrong might fall forever, / Neath the onward march of
right.” 32 This type of language was repeated often in songs,
poems, and speeches at Iowa reunions and national
reunions. His wording is characteristic of other similar
works which praise the triumph of right over wrong, in
which freedom for the slaves and restoration of the Union
were on the side of the right, while treason and slavery
were on the side of the wrong. By contrasting the two
forces in terms of right and wrong, Iowa G.A.R. veterans
created a pro-Union nationalism that rejected treason and
Confederate sympathies.
Iowa veterans also sang songs intended to
perpetuate the pro-Union imagined community that they
had created. These songs included patriotic songs, proUnion nationalism songs, and anti-Confederate songs. At
the 1913 Iowa reunion, “Battle Cry of Freedom” was sung
to wild applause as three veterans paraded across the stage
wearing Union blue, carrying the Stars and Stripes, and
brandishing muskets from the war. They sung “The Boys
Who Wore the Blue,” which celebrates the bravery of
Union soldiers under heavy fire. Other songs included
patriotic, pro-America songs like “The Star Spangled
32

Pierson H. Bristow, “Retrospection,” in Journal of Proceedings
Thirty-ninth Annual Encampment Department of Iowa G.A.R. (Des
Moines: J. H. Welch Printing Co., 1913), 168-170.

65

Bautz

Banner” and “Columbia, the Gem of the Ocean.” These
songs reminded veterans that they had fought for America
and for a just cause. They also sang pro-Union nationalistic
songs like “Up with the Flag!” and “Marching through
Georgia,” which helped solidify the pro-Union nationalism
of the veterans. Veterans also sang anti-South songs like
“We Rose a Band of Patriots,” a rewording of the
Confederate national anthem “Bonnie Blue Flag” which,
among other things, changed a line about Southern rights
and liberties into one about “foul treason.” 33 These songs
were clearly intended to take shots at Southern views of the
war by twisting pro-Confederate words to be antiConfederate.
Yet for all the importance of songs and poems in
building nationalist ideology, orations both published and
spoken tell a much more explicit tale of a developing proUnion nationalism and pushing back against the Lost
Cause. Speeches also demonstrate the emerging gap
between civilians’ and veterans’ memory of the war. As
years passed, public officials who had not lived during the
war began to reshape the memory of the war to fit a more
reconciliatory tone. Veterans, however, never entirely
accepted this new way of thinking about the war. At the
War Department, semi-official discrimination occurred
against Confederate groups during the 1890s led by the
Secretary of War, Russell Alger. A former G.A.R.
commander, Alger would, for instance, divert tents to
G.A.R. reunions while refusing to give any to U.C.V.
reunions. In the 1910s, a new Secretary of War, Lindley
Garrison, who had just been born when the war ended,

33

William Smith, Complete G.A.R. Songbook (Detroit: Herald
Publishing House, 1887), 31.
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insisted upon equal treatment for all veterans’ groups. 34 As
veterans began to leave public office, their non-veteran
replacements tended to be more reconciliatory in their
approach to sectionalism, as can be seen in Iowa.
In 1913, both the current governor of Iowa and a
former governor of Iowa gave speeches to the annual
encampment of the Iowa G.A.R. at the evening campfires.
Both men had grown up during the war and were old
enough to remember the fighting. George Clarke, the sitting
governor who was thirteen years old when the war ended,
addressed the veterans first. He invoked Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address to remind veterans of the good they did
in the war. He argued that the Union army had “made
possible… a great destiny for the United States.” 35 He
highlighted the significance of the results: “No slavery, an
indissoluble union.”36 Just a few hours later, ex-Governor
Frank Jackson, who was eleven when the war ended, rose
to address the veterans, invoking similar imagery and
themes. He began by telling veterans that he, too, had been
there – that he had lived through the war just as they had.
34
This conclusion is drawn from careful analysis of press copies of
letters sent by the Secretaries of War from 1896 to 1913. For instance,
in 1897, a U.C.V. reunion was denied access to Department tents for
use at their reunion under the claim that some tents had been provided
for the general festival where the reunion was to occur and that the rest
of the tents were needed elsewhere. Two days later, a similar request
from the G.A.R. was approved and the tents which had been
“unavailable” were diverted to the G.A.R. reunion instead. By 1913,
the Secretary began chastising G.A.R. veterans for trying to valorize
the Union too much over the Confederacy on a monument. Press
Copies of Letters Sent, War Department, 1896-1913, record group 107,
entry A1 82, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
35
George W. Clark, “Address to the Iowa Department of the G.A.R.,”
Journal of the Thirty-ninth Annual Encampment, 120.
36
Ibid., 121.

67

Bautz

This created a shared space where an imagined community
could be built. He then went on to talk about how the
veterans had “licked the Southern Confederacy” and could
still play an active role in upholding the doctrine of “human
liberty” and progress as championed by the Republican
party. His speech was a call to the victorious veterans to
embrace the South to “reunite” the country but not failing
to be watchful of the South nonetheless. 37
Veteran rhetoric remained pro-Union, but other
civilian leaders who had not lived during the war, such as
Mayor James Hanna of Des Moines, focused their speeches
on sacrifice and duty, two motifs of the reconciliationist
camp of Civil War memory. 38 Hanna began his address to
the 1913 Encampment of the Iowa G.A.R. in Des Moines
by calling the 1860s a “heroic age… filled with heroic
issues and heroic deeds.” He went on to remind veterans of
“the sacrifices and deeds of that time” which would inspire
generations to come. He even went so far as to hint that the
veterans were unjustly biased in their sectionalism, saying
“We are sometimes too close to things to see them fully.”39
Noticeably absent from Hanna’s address are any references
to the triumph of the Union, Southern traitors, and the
rebellion that was the war. Union veterans called the Civil
War “the rebellion” or “treason;” Hanna termed it the
“situation” or the “great issues of the country.” 40 He spent
more time emphasizing shared sacrifice and heroism than
anything else. Clearly, Hanna had bought into the idea of
reconciliation.
37

Frank Jackson, “Address to the Iowa Department of the G.A.R.,”
Journal of the Thirty-ninth Annual Encampment, 139-141.
38
James Hanna, “Address to the Iowa Department of the G.A.R.,”
Journal of the Thirty-ninth Annual Encampment, 122-123.
39
Hanna, “Address to the Iowa Department of the G.A.R.,” 122.
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Another good example of this civilian-veteran
divide came in the form of how Iowa veterans reacted to
the praise showered on the memory of Robert E. Lee by
Northerners and Southerners alike on the one hundredth
anniversary of his birth in 1907. When a New York
magazine, Collier’s Weekly, published an editorial
valorizing Lee in 1907, Iowa veterans blasted the editorial
in a pamphlet which was circulated to all G.A.R. posts
around the country. Collier’s wrote that “America has had
no nobler citizen,” calling Lee “grave, strong, devoted” and
asking all Americans North and South to rally behind
him. 41 To the Iowa G.A.R. Patriotic Instructor, Robert
Kissick, these eulogies were “teaching false patriotism.”42
He laid into Collier’s in an editorial he sent in response and
in a pamphlet that was circulated to G.A.R. posts around
the country. He argued that Lee had been “a traitor” and
likened him to Benedict Arnold, the infamous turncoat of
the Revolutionary War. 43 He went on to quote the
responses of numerous veterans from Iowa to his article.
W. D. Kinser, for instance, was disgusted that anyone
would honor a traitor who fought to prop up a government
founded on slavery. This pattern held true for most Iowa
veterans who either criticized Lee as an uncaring traitor
who backed the moral evil of slavery or sent simple letters
of concurrence with Kissick’s opinions. 44
As politicians and civilian publications moved
towards reconciliation, veterans, like those in the Iowa
G.A.R., continued to maintain a pro-Union nationalism that
41

“Robert E. Lee,” Collier’s Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 17 (January 1907),
quoted in Robert Kissick, The Duty and Necessity of Teaching True
American Patriotism (Des Moines: J. H. Welch Printing Co., 1907), 9.
42
Kissick, Teaching True American Patriotism, 7.
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44
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fought to beat back the reconcilationist views of civilians.
While civilians lavished praise on Southern heroes, Iowa
veterans were busy singing anti-Confederacy songs,
reading poems about how Southerners were traitors, and
reciting speeches about the patriotism of Union veterans. 45
Historians claim that reconciliatory rhetoric arose during
this period, but records from Iowa G.A.R. encampments
reveal that veterans remained sectional, sometimes strongly
so, even in the twentieth century. This pattern continued
even as the rest of the country tried to move beyond the
sectionalism of the Civil War Era.
The G.A.R. In Decline: 1913-1956
Although most historians view the G.A.R. as a
slowly declining power relegated to Memorial Day
commemorations and the occasional sentimental Blue-Gray
reunions after 1913, Iowa G.A.R. reunions demonstrate that
veterans still actively promoted a pro-Union nationalism,
albeit with slightly altered rhetoric and actions. 46 It is true
that the declining population of veterans meant that grand
reunions occurred less frequently. Historians are correct in
arguing that the power of the national G.A.R. was on the
decline. The last large national G.A.R. encampment
occurred in 1922 in Iowa, and it was billed as such. 47 It was
45

The editors at Collier’s Weekly were just one example of this
phenomenon of civilians praising Southern heroes. Theodore Roosevelt
in his 1907 address in Washington, D.C. on the anniversary of Lee’s
birthday praised Lee as an American hero and one of America’s
greatest generals.
46
McConnell, Glorious Contentment, xvi. Blight, Race and Reunion¸
198-201. It should be noted that Blight essentially sees the G.A.R. as
early as the mid-1890s.
47
State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa Department of the Grand
Army of the Republic, 25. The 1922 G.A.R. reunion in Des Moines was
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at this reunion that, for the second time in the history of the
G.A.R., an Iowan became Commander-in-Chief of the
G.A.R.. By 1917, the Iowa G.A.R. membership had
dwindled to a few thousand veterans. This did not mean the
G.A.R. had lost all its power, though. Indeed, local posts
such as those in Iowa continued to push for the placement
of American flags in every classroom and other such
patriotic activities. In other words, although the Iowa
Department was in decline in terms of members, it retained
considerable public influence.
The report of William Johnson, the Department of
Iowa G.A.R. Patriotic Instructor, at the 1917 state reunion
gives a good glimpse at the work the Iowa G.A.R. was
undertaking to promote patriotism in the state. The report
includes a list from the national office with responses from
the Iowa Patriotic Instructor. Of note are the following
details: of the forty-three posts in Iowa in 1917, thirty-six
had provided over 300 American flags for placement in
every school in their area, all posts ensured that a state law
requiring the flag to be raised at school every day was
enforced, most posts ensured that the Pledge of Allegiance
was said daily in those schools, all posts ensured that
“patriotic days” were observed in schools, and most posts
reported on how Memorial Day was observed at schools
and in towns. 48 These actions held a special significance for
billed as “The Last Great Encampment.” The last G.A.R. reunion was
held in 1949 with a scant six attendees.
48
Iowa Grand Army of the Republic, Journal of the Forty-third Annual
Encampment Department of Iowa Grand Army of the Republic at
Davenport (Des Moines: J. H. Welch Printing Co., 1917), 46-47. Of the
206 schools in the state, 160 reported to statistics to Johnson. “Patriotic
Days” included Lincoln’s Birthday, Washington’s Birthday, Memorial
Day, and Flag Day. The Fourth of July is conspicuously absent from
the list.

71

Bautz

the pro-Union nationalism that these veterans were trying
to promote – they pushed for the Union to be celebrated in
every classroom, reminding students that they were part of
one nation under one flag because the Union had won the
war.
The placement of flags and other pro-Union
imagery was a way for local posts to solidify pro-Union
nationalism even as the national G.A.R.’s power declined.
Flags and national symbols play a large role in the creation
of imagined communities. Anderson notes, “Out of the
American welter came these imagined realities: nationstates, republican institutions, common citizenships…
national flags and anthems, etc.” 49 That G.A.R. veterans
were working to ensure that national flags and pledges
were in schools speaks powerfully to the nation-building
occurring through the G.A.R.. But it was a pro-Union
nationalism that the G.A.R. was trying to foster. Alongside
the flag, the Iowa G.A.R. placed copies of Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address to assert to a new generation that the
Union had fought to free slaves and protect the country. 50
Students would celebrate the Union Memorial Day, not the
Confederate ones. 51 Rather than simply being a Memorial
Day organization after 1913, the G.A.R. worked feverishly
to ensure that the pro-Union nationalism they had fostered
among themselves would be passed on to future
generations.
49

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 81.
Iowa G.A.R., Journal of the Forty-third Annual Encampment, 46.
51
Confederates and many Southern states tended to celebrate a
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Day,” History Channel’s History in the Headlines, last modified May
24, 2013, accessed March 25, 2015, http://www.history.com/news/8things-you-may-not-know-about-memorial-day
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As World War I approached, veterans continued to
give pro-Union speeches, but now they emphasized their
status as ‘true’ patriots during the Civil War in contrast to
the Confederates. For example, Colonel Palmer, one of the
last surviving officers from Sherman’s staff, rose at the
1917 Iowa reunion and reminded veterans of their wartime
experiences. He attacked Southerners when he announced
to the men that though he had not voted for President
Wilson, he would stand by him during World War I like a
true patriot. 52On the surface this may not appear to be
overly insulting, but when considered alongside Southern
secession after Lincoln’s election in 1860, the true
implication of Palmer’s statement becomes clear. Palmer
went on to rebut claims by the Daughters of Confederate
Veterans (D.C.V.) and the U.C.V. that terrible prison
conditions existed in the North and South. He reminded
veterans that unlike Confederates, “When we captured
[Confederates] they were cared for… and cared for
humanely.” 53 This is hardly the kind of comparison a
reconciliationist would make. The constant harkening back
to proud Union victories in speeches by G.A.R. members
encompassed both a patriotic furor for the U.S. in World
War I and a pro-Union nationalism that was meant to
bolster the support of Union veterans.
In stark contrast to Palmer’s speech, William
Harding, the governor of Iowa and a man who had not lived
during the war, told veterans to put aside their political and
sectional differences to support the war effort during the
First World War and not to be concerned with the
president’s Southern roots and Democratic support – only
52

David Palmer, “Address to the Iowa Department of the G.A.R.,”
Journal of the Forty-third Annual Encampment, 161.
53
Ibid., 162.
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with being patriotic in the war. His emphasis on sacrifice
and duty were reconciliationist. 54 Harding attempted to
instill a reconciliatory joint patriotism of the sort Blight
identifies.
The songs sung at the 1917 Davenport reunion that
later appeared in an Iowa G.A.R. songbook in 1923
retained their pro-Union nationalist bent. One veteran sang
songs about how the flag that made America free in 1776
was the same flag that freed the slave and crushed the
rebellion. He also sang songs of how the recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance in the South was a reminder that the
Union had triumphed in the end. 55 The songs appearing the
Iowa G.A.R. songbook included the patriotic songs
“America” and “Battle Hymn of the Republic” and the proUnion songs “Battle Cry of Freedom” and “Marching
through Georgia.” In fact, pro-Union songs make up half of
the five-page song book. 56
After the World War I Era, the Iowa G.A.R.’s
numbers continued to decline as did the frequency of their
reunions. By 1935, only a few hundred members remained.
In 1948, the last Iowa veteran of the Civil War died, and
after a brief memorial reunion in 1949, the Iowa
Department of the G.A.R. was disbanded. 57 Nevertheless, it
is clear from the reunions that did occur that pro-Union
nationalism was still alive and well during the waning years
54

William Harding, “Address to the Iowa Department of the G.A.R.,”
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of the Iowa G.A.R.. Not even the collective national spirit
of World War I was able to completely eradicate it in favor
of the umbrella nationalism Janney argues for.
Conclusion
From its founding in 1868 to its dissolution in 1949,
the Iowa Department of the G.A.R. played a major role in
shaping a pro-Union nationalism among Iowa veterans at
reunions and through pamphlets. The reunions of Iowa
G.A.R. veterans demonstrate how sectionalism and proUnion nationalism lingered in the G.A.R. well into the
twentieth century. During the early years of the G.A.R.,
Iowans began creating a pro-Union nationalism founded on
the idea that the right had triumphed over the wrong. They
sang pro-Union songs and wrote pro-Union poems. During
the 1880s to 1910s, Iowans continued the traditions they
began in the early days of the G.A.R. singing pro-Union
songs and giving sectionalist speeches. Even in the later
days of the G.A.R., Iowa veterans continued to promote a
pro-Union nationalism by demonstrating true patriotism in
supporting a president during war regardless of party and
having flags and pro-Union articles, such as the Gettysburg
Address, disseminated in schools around the state. As
Secretary of War Belknap had noted in 1870, these Union
veterans were surrounding themselves with “the memories
of battle … once again.” 58
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William Belknap, “Address of General Wm. W. Belknap Secretary
of War at the Re-union of Iowa Soldiers, Des Moines, Iowa,” August
31, 1870, 14-16.

75

Bautz

Bibliography
Primary Sources
Belknap, William. “Address of General Wm. W.
Belknap Secretary of War at the Re-union of Iowa
Soldiers, Des Moines, Iowa.” August 31, 1870.
By Laws and Roster of Torrence Post No. 2 Grand
Army of the Republic Department of Iowa. Keokuk,
1891.
First and Second Re-unions of the Thirty-Fifth Iowa
Infantry Held at Muscatine, Iowa. Muscatine, 1890.
Iowa Department of the Grand Army of the
Republic, Journal of the Forty-third Annual
Encampment Department of Iowa Grand Army of
the Republic at Davenport. Des Moines: J. H.
Welch Printing Co., 1917.
_____. Journal of the Seventy-fifth Annual
Encampment of the Iowa Department of the Grand
Army of the Republic. Des Moines, 1949.
_____. Journal of Proceedings Thirty-ninth Annual
Encampment Department of Iowa G.A.R. Des
Moines: J. H. Welch Printing Co., 1913.
Kissick, Robert. The Duty and Necessity of
Teaching True American Patriotism. Des Moines: J.
H. Welch Printing Co., 1907.

76

The Memory of Battle

Lee, Robert E. “General Order No. 9.” April 10,
1865.
Press Copies of Letters Sent, War Department,
1896-1913. Record Group 107. National Archives.
Washington, D.C.
“Robert E. Lee.” Collier’s Weekly. Vol. 38, No. 17.
January 1907.
Smith, William. Complete G.A.R. Songbook.
Detroit: Herald Publishing House, 1887.
Songs of the Grand Army of the Republic and
Auxiliary Organizations Iowa Department. Fort
Dodge: Essenger Printing Co., 1923.
State Historical Society of Iowa. The Iowa
Department of the Grand Army of the Republic.
Iowa City: Athens Press, 1936.
Secondary Sources
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. New York: Verso, 2006.
Blight, David. Race and Reunion: The Civil War in
American Memory. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2001.
Bohannon, Keith. “’These Few Gray-Haired, BattleScarred Veterans’: Confederate Army Reunions in
Georgia, 1885-95.” In The Myth of the Lost Cause
77

Bautz

and Civil War History, edited by Gary W. Gallagher
and Alan T. Nolan. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2000: 89-110.
Foster, Gaines. Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat,
the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New
South 1865-1913. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1987.
Gannon, Barbara. The Won Cause: Black and White
Comradeship in the Grand Army of the Republic.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2011.
Janney, Caroline. Remembering the Civil War:
Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013.
Kammen, Michael. Mystic Chords of Memory. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.
McConnell, Stuart. Glorious Contentment: The
Grand Army of the Republic, 1865-1900. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.
Neff, John. Honoring the Civil War Dead:
Commemoration and the Problem of Reconciliation.
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005.
Purcell, Sarah. Sealed With Blood: War, Sacrifice,
and Memory in Revolutionary America.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2002.

78

The Memory of Battle

Waldrep, Christopher. Vicksburg’s Long Shadow:
The Civil War Legacy of Race and Remembrance.
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005.

79

Ambrose Burnside, the Ninth Army Corps, and the
Battle of Spotsylvania Court House
Ryan T. Quint
Spring had come and that meant that the
bloodletting could begin anew. For Major General
Ambrose Everett Burnside that campaign commenced on
April 13, 1864 when he arrived in Annapolis, Maryland to
rendezvous with his Ninth Army Corps. 1 Around the city
that was home to the U.S. Naval Academy the soldiers in
the corps’ three divisions milled about, drilling and
organizing. Most of the men in the divisions were brand
new recruits, learning the school of the soldier for the first
time. These recruits were shuffled into regiments shrunken
by years of arduous fighting for the Union all the way from
the North Carolina Coast in the spring of 1862 to, most
recently, the Siege of Knoxville. 2
The same day that Burnside arrived in Annapolis he
paraded the Ninth Corps in review for recently-promoted
Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant. 3 As general-in-chief
1

William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1991), 345.
2
Augustus Woodbury, Major General Ambrose E. Burnside and the
Ninth Army Corps: A Narrative of Campaigns (Providence: Sidney S.
Rider & Brother, 1867), 365, 367; William F. Fox, Regimental Losses
in the American Civil War (Albany: Albany Publishing Company,
1889), 81-83.
3
A word on the convention of writing out Federal corps is useful here.
Though the practice of identifying Federal corps with Roman numerals
is the accepted practice today, during the war the corps were identified
with either regular numbers or were spelled out. I also agree with the
late Harry Pfanz, who wrote that “[F]or me…Roman numerals always
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of the United States Army, it was expected that he would
have set up his headquarters in the nation’s capital, but
Grant decided to take the field. Grant found the Ninth
Corps in “an admirable position for such a reinforcement.”
From its location Burnside’s men “could be brought at the
last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the
Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of
Norfolk, in Virginia, or North Carolina, to operate against
Richmond from that direction.” Though Grant had
witnessed these soldiers pass in review this was hardly the
reason he had come all the way to Annapolis from his field
headquarters near Culpeper; rather it was to “confer with
Burnside about the role the Ninth Corps would play in the
spring campaign….” 4
That role, Burnside soon found out, was to support
the Army of the Potomac with an overland march. On April
23 the Ninth Corps packed up its tents and formed into
marching columns. To the surprise of many of the soldiers,
the corps began to march towards Washington, D.C., not
down to the Annapolis docks. It had made its fame on a
naval expedition against North Carolina’s Outer Banks in
1862 and still had the legacy to prove it: its insignia was an
anchor and cannon, crossed over a shield. Many expected
to repeat their success at sea with another strike at a rebel
require a pause for translation that snags my train of thought.” Harry
W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1987), xvii.
4
Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters (New York: Literary
Classics of the United States, 1990 reprint), 477; Brooks D. Simpson,
Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 271.
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target. 5 But this coming campaign would involve no ships
for the Ninth Corps, only grueling marches and hard
fighting.
As the corps neared Washington City a fourth
division, consisting entirely of United States Colored
Troops, was added to the corps. Burnside’s command was
now composed of close to 21,000 men and 72 cannons
ready for action. 6 Entering the capital, the corps marched
past throngs of cheering crowds while the divisions’ “soiled
and tattered flags, bearing inscriptions of battles in six
states, east and west, were silent and affecting witnesses of
their valor and their sacrifices.” 7 Crossing Long Bridge into
Virginia, the corps continued its march until, by May 5,
they were closing in on the Army of the Potomac. As the
regiments neared the battlefield, one man later wrote,
“Every soldier knew that we were about to participate in a
battle, as the booming of cannon and the rattle of musketry
were heard long before... The trail of the regiments
preceding us was made plain by the thousands of playing
cards strewn along the wayside, which they had discarded
from their blouse pockets to make room for their

5

For the naval expedition, see Marvel, 41-97; for the corps insignia see
C. McKeever, Civil War Battle flags of the Union Army and Order of
Battle (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1997 reprint), 81-82.
6
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& Company, 2013), 168.
7
Woodbury, 368.
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testaments, which had reposed unopened, in many cases,
for weeks, in their knapsacks.” 8
For Ambrose Burnside, the march to join the Army
of the Potomac would not have marshaled good memories.
He had last seen the army after resigning its command
following the horrific defeat at Fredericksburg in
December, 1862, followed immediately by the
embarrassing “Mud March.” As Burnside prepared to leave
the army in early 1863, he remarked, “Farewell Gentlemen,
there are no pleasant reminiscences for me connected with
the Army of the Potomac.” 9 For its part, the Army of the
Potomac was not sorry to see Burnside to go, and blamed
the side-whiskered general wholeheartedly for its bloody
defeat.
Now, in the spring of 1864, Burnside was returning
to the Army of the Potomac, and it was already creating
problems. The most serious matter was that of seniority—
with Burnside’s return he should, by his commission’s date,
assume command of the Army of the Potomac, taking it
away from George Meade. Burnside had been
commissioned a major general of volunteers to date from
March 18, 1862, while Meade did not attain the same rank
8

Allen D. Albert, editor, History of the Forty-Fifth Regiment
Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteer Infantry 1861-1865 (Williamsport,
PA: Grit Publishing Company, 1912), 114.
9
A. Wilson Greene, “Morale, Maneuver, and Mud” in Gary W.
Gallagher, The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the
Rappahannock (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995),
215; Francis A. O’Reilly, The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War
on the Rappahannock (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
2003), 495-496.
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until November 29 of the same year. 10 No one expected or
would have allowed for Burnside to take command of the
army, and Grant settled on an independent structure for the
Ninth Corps— Burnside would report directly to Grant and
get orders from him while the other three infantry corps
would answer to Meade. It was a clunky system that would
prove largely ineffective—especially at Spotsylvania,
whose bloodiest fighting lay just under a week away. 11
The second problem facing Burnside’s return to the
Army of the Potomac, even with his independent
command, was the fact that no one within the army had any
confidence in him. Though beyond the scope of this
narrative the second day of the Battle of the Wilderness on
May 6, 1864 is worth mentioning in passing only because it
shows the lack of confidence and low expectations that
army officers had for Burnside. On the Federal left
Winfield Scott Hancock’s Second Corps crashed through
the woods and hit elements of A.P. Hill’s Confederates—
some of the same rebels that Burnside would fight at
Spotsylvania in six days’ time. As Burnside’s corps was
coming up, his three divisions, led by Thomas Stevenson,
Robert Potter, and Orlando Willcox, were all ordered

10

George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of Officers and Graduates
of the U.S. MMilitary Academy , at West Point, N.Y: Volume II (New
York: D. Van Nostrand, 1868), 191; George W. Cullum, Biographical
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forward. 12 But in the thick confines of the Wilderness the
troops were given unclear directions and “bushwhacked
toward their indistinct goal,” as one historian writes.13
Another historian, Gordon C. Rhea, wrote that “For the rest
of the morning, the [Ninth] Corps remained lost to the
Federal war effort. Occasionally messages emerged from
the undergrowth, but the troops themselves seemed to have
been swallowed up by the Wilderness.” 14
To the men and officers of the Army of the Potomac
though, it mattered little that the three divisions got lost.
What they remembered was the fact that when they needed
support, Burnside came up short. As Theodore Lyman, aide
to George Meade, met with Hancock, he reported that
Burnside was slowly making progress, to which the Second
Corps commander bellowed, “I knew it…. Just what I
expected.” 15 One of Hancock’s staff officers wrote years
later that when Burnside did finally get into action,
“assistance it could hardly be called, for, when Burnside at
last made his attack, Hancock had already been driven
back….” 16 Charles Wainwright, an artillery officer in the
Fifth Corps, wrote in his diary, “Burnside somehow is
12

The Fourth Division, commanded by Edward Ferrero, was detached
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never up to the mark when the tug comes.” Wainwright
also commented on Burnside’s subordinate officers, saying,
“I got a very poor impression of the corps.” 17
Following the tactical stalemate at the Wilderness,
which resulted in little other than close to 30,000 casualties,
Grant decided to shift his forces south, towards
Spotsylvania Court House. Burnside’s men moved back
towards Chancellorsville and then began sliding further
south, reaching the Fredericksburg Road on May 9. This
road ran straight from Fredericksburg to Grant’s objective
of Spotsylvania Court House. When Burnside’s men
reached the road, they now served as the Federals’ left
flank. 18
With Orlando Willcox’s division leading the way
down the Fredericksburg Road, Burnside soon a problem
that would plague the entire Federal command. Bad maps
had been distributed before the campaign began and now,
with Grant trying to issue orders to both Burnside and
Meade’s Army of the Potomac, the problems associated
with those maps bubbled to the surface. First was the maps’
quality—Theodore Lyman wrote that the maps were
17
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The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow
Tavern: May 7-12, 1864 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1997), 13.
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printed “on wretched spongy paper, which wore out after
being carried a few days in the pocket….” Furthermore,
Lyman pointed out that many of the maps had key points
on them entirely out of position—pertinent to the Battle of
the Spotsylvania Court House was the fact that the
courthouse itself was portrayed “two and one half miles to
the west [from where it is actually located].” 19
Most problematic to Burnside on May 9 was the
issue of the location of a “Gate”, as well as the Gayle
house. This problem would resonate through the next
couple of days of the battle, culminating with the fighting
on May 12. Grant issued orders to Burnside, ordering him
to send “a small force from Gate toward Spotsylvania to
reconnoiter the roads and enemy’s position in that
direction, and especially have all roads leading to your
right… examined… and whether they lead to the positions
occupied by General Meade’s forces…..” 20 In other words,
Willcox, whose division was leading the corps, was to
skirmish ahead and see which roads, if any, could link up
with the Army of the Potomac so that the Federal line could
be one solid front.
There are numerable problems with this order, but
the main concern is the usage of “Gate.” Going back to the
horrendous maps, it appears that “Gate” was mentioned on
both Grant’s and Meade’s maps, but not Burnside’s. The
choice to write Gate as a proper noun also implies that
19
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Grant and Meade both believed that the Gate was the
property of a local. There was indeed a gate along the Ninth
Corps’ advance, but it was just that—a toll gate, not a large
house, and furthermore, it was far to the rear of Willcox’s
advance. Nonetheless, Willcox pushed on ahead, towards
the Gayle house, a structure on the north-eastern side of the
river. There his skirmishers ran into Confederate pickets of
infantry and dismounted cavalry and the two sides began to
open a lively fire. Willcox reported back to Burnside that
he had “Found the enemy’s vedettes one-half mile before
reaching Gayle’s house.” 21 Reporting back to Grant,
Burnside reiterated the “Gayle” house. And then, in a snafu
classic for military history, both Grant and Burnside
assumed the other was misspelling the g-word—whether it
was “Gate” or “Gayle” and neither asked for clarification.
It didn’t help that on the map that Grant possessed, the gate
was marked where the Gayle house actually stood. 22
At the end of the day on May 9, Willcox had
nonetheless pushed across the Ni River and drove away the
Confederate pickets. From his current position Willcox was
only about 1.5 miles away from Spotsylvania Court House,
and ahead of him lay just more Confederate pickets—had
the Third Division pressed down the road, the likelihood of
capturing the courthouse and its vital crossroads was very
21
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high. The Federal high command’s faulty cartography
depicted the distance between the Ni River crossing and
Spotsylvania as 3.5 miles, however. Gordon C. Rhea
summarizes this whole episode as “Burnside missed a
superb opportunity.” 23 Later that night Burnside finally
tried to clear up the confusion, writing, “The position
occupied by General Willcox is at Mr. Gayle’s house, there
being no such place as Gate in this section….” 24 The note
apparently did not stick; in his postwar history of the
campaign, Meade’s chief of staff Andrew Humphreys
wrote that “General Burnside moved with the Ninth
Corps… to Gate’s house, on the road from [Spotsylvania]
Court House to Fredericksburg, and then toward the Court
House, crossing the [Ni] at Gate’s house (a mile and a half
from the Court House)….” 25 At least by the 1880s
Humphreys had learned the true distance from the river to
Spotsylvania.
If May 9 had been difficult for Burnside in trying to
get through the ambiguous orders, May 10 was difficult
because Burnside lost his “ablest division commander.” 26
Brigadier General Thomas Stevenson brought his First
Division forward to support Willcox’s command in
solidifying their front on the southern side of the Ni River.
Seeking some shade (the mercury recorded 89 degrees at 2

23
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PM in Washington City—65 miles north), 27 Stevenson
lounged about and smoked cigars with his staff. Then,
breaking the brief reprieve in an extremely bloody fashion,
a bullet cracked through the back of Stevenson’s head,
toppling him over. The twenty-eight year old Brigadier
General was dead almost instantly. Burnside wrote that
Stevenson’s death was a “severe misfortune” and that the
general had “on all occasions proved himself an efficient
soldier.” 28 As Stevenson’s body was sent back to Boston,
Colonel Daniel Leasure took over command of the First
Division. One of his new staff officers wrote, “I had a
favorable opinion of him, but I can’t say I retain it.” 29 Over
the course of the next day Burnside was hesitant to further
use the division under Leasure.
By May 10, the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House
was into its third day. By this point of the battle
Confederate engineers had laid out their defensive works—
the most famous being the Mule Shoe Salient. Measuring
“1,800 yards wide at the base and 1,320 yards deep from
the base to the tip”, 30 the Mule Shoe was truly massive and
also proved to be a liability for its Confederate defenders; a
salient can be attacked from three sides at once, making it
27
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difficult to defend. As Lee’s line continued, the
Confederate engineers followed the natural contour lines of
the ridge they were on and dug a second salient, this one “a
minor protrusion in comparison [to the Mule Shoe]… The
trench was over five feet deep, and pine logs topped the
parapet.” 31 This second salient would be guarded mostly by
men of Henry Heth’s division, thus the position got its
name—Heth’s Salient. These works would soon become
the focus of major Federal attacks.
There was little fighting on Burnside’s front on May
11, but plenty of maneuvering. As Grant planned his big
offensive against Lee’s line for the next day, the Ninth
Corps spent the majority of the day re-crossing the Ni River
back to the north side. In the midst of driving rain storms,
this proved difficult to do. Once the high command realized
what was going on, the corps was ordered to re-cross the
river again and regain their works on the south side of the
river. The end result was that the Ninth Corps spent the
majority of May 11 in the rain marching back and forth
only to end up in the exact same place as they had started,
only now exhausted and soaked to the bone. Burnside
denied ordering the move, as did Grant—historian William
Matter writes that “Until more evidence is uncovered, this
episode will remain a mystery.” 32
In the meantime, the soldiers of the Ninth Corps
suffered for the lack of shelter. One solder in the 57th
Massachusetts wrote, “The afternoon of the 11th [of May]
31
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was rainy, which continued through the night. The FiftySeventh rested upon their arms without shelter of any kind,
the ground was wet and the men’s clothing also, with no
opportunity of getting dry; sleep was impossible….”33
Another soldier in the 7th Rhode Island added, “The rain
poured in torrents over the hundreds lying around. Few had
blankets.” 34 For all of their marches, the soldiers did not
reach their trenches until about 10:00 PM, which meant
they had about six hours to lie around in the mud until
going forward. 35
While the Ninth Corps moved about and struggled
with the elements, Burnside got his orders for the next
day’s attack. Grant’s message to Burnside was timestamped at 4:00 PM, but the latter probably did not get the
order “until near dark”—sunset on May 11 was three
minutes shy of 7:00 PM. 36 In his orders, Grant wrote that
“You will move against the enemy with your entire force
promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o’clock
to-morrow morning. Let your preparations for this attack be
conducted with the utmost secrecy, and veiled entirely from
the enemy.” 37 To assist Burnside, Grant ordered two of his
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aides, Cyrus Comstock and Orville Babcock, to attach
themselves to the Ninth Corps staff and direct the attacks.
After getting his orders Burnside began to plan his
corps’ attacks. Some have criticized Burnside for his lack
of overall preparations in these stages of the battle—one
historian writes that he was “befuddled” and “dithered” in
front of the enemy on May 10, and he characterized
Burnside’s fighting on May 12 as “a spectacle of
embarrassing confusion.” 38 Ambrose Burnside serves as an
easy target for these historians as the debacle at
Fredericksburg will always stain his name, but it is unfair
to claim that Burnside did nothing but spew incompetence;
in the midst of the Ninth Corps’ preparations on the night
of May 11 it is important to remember Grant’s warning to
keep the movements an “utmost secrecy, and veiled
entirely from the enemy,” a line that his two aides also
reiterated. 39 In this setting, it is easy to understand why
Burnside was hesitant to send scouts forward to reconnoiter
the ground, especially when Comstock, one of the aides
from Grant, had already done so earlier in the day, could
provide Burnside with whatever directions the he needed.
Furthermore, after arriving at Burnside’s headquarters in
the dark, “Comstock suggested no reconnaissance.” 40
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In the midst of all this, another curveball was
thrown at Burnside when Major General Thomas L.
Crittenden arrived and took over command of the corps’
First Division. 41 Crittenden was another general whose
presence threatened to upend the army’s hierarchy; his
major general’s commission dated from July 17, 1862, four
months before George Meade. 42 By assigning Crittenden to
the independent Ninth Corps, the matter of commissions
were avoided, but Crittenden had other baggage he brought
along. In the Chickamauga Campaign in the early fall of
1863 Crittenden had commanded the Army of the
Cumberland’s Twenty-First Corps, totaling almost 11,000
infantrymen. 43 With his defeat at Chickamauga, William S.
Rosecrans looked for scapegoats, and one of those men was
Crittenden. In late January of 1864, a court of inquiry was
established to “investigate the conduct of” three generals,
including Crittenden. 44 Over the next twenty-one days the
court heard testimony and examined the Battle of
Chickamauga in detail before it absolved Crittenden and
wrote, “The evidence… respecting General Crittenden’s
operations… not only shows no cause for censure, but, on
the contrary, that his whole conduct was most
creditable….” 45 Though absolved, the court was still a stain
41
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on Crittenden, and whereas he had commanded close to
11,000 troops at Chickamauga, his First Division command
in the Ninth Corps now only tallied about 2,100. 46
With poor maps, a tired and soaked corps, and a
new division commander with only a couple of hours’
experience in command, Ambrose Burnside prepared his
attack in the early morning hours of Thursday, May 12,
1864. According to orders, Robert Potter’s Second Division
left their works around four in the morning and began to
slide north, looking to link up with Hancock’s Second
Corps. By punctually ordering Potter’s division up, Gordon
C. Rhea says Burnside was “displaying unaccustomed
vigor”, but Burnside biographer William Marvel would
disagree with this assessment, writing “Burnside had never
had much trouble holding up his end of a schedule
before[.]” 47 Either way, Potter’s force of about 5,700 men
crashed through the woods and struck the eastern salient of
the Mule Shoe just minutes after Hancock’s men had
completely shattered the top of it.48 The Confederate
defenders of the tip of the salient were almost all captured
en masse, leaving Hancock’s men with some 2,700
prisoners to take care of. 49 However, the success also came
46
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with problems. An officer in Hancock’s corps wrote that,
“All line and formation was now lost…Amid the wild
confusion of the glorious success, it was difficult to
preserve order.” 50 In this confused melee, Potter’s three
brigades hit below Hancock and got some of their own
spoils, including two captured cannon. 51
The confusion of the Federal breakthrough assisted
the Confederate response immensely. Gathering his brigade
of almost 2,000 North Carolinians, James Lane pushed up
to the edge of the salient. As other Confederate brigades,
mostly from Ewell’s Second Corps, were hitting Hancock,
Lane focused his attention on Potter’s men. His five
regiments in tow, Lane moved forward and later wrote, “In
the best of spirits the brigade welcomed the furious assault,
which soon followed, with prolonged cheers and death
dealing volleys[.]” 52
Lane’s men were soon joined by the combined
weight of the 2,500 men present in Alfred Scales’ and
Edward Thomas’ brigades. The three Confederate brigades
soon proved too much for Potter’s men and the Federals
gave ground, even giving up the two cannon they had
captured earlier. Potter wrote in his report, “The connection
on our right with the Second Corps being broken… we
were forced out of the enemy’s work with a few prisoners.”
50
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By 8:00 AM Potter’s men were out of their breach and
spent the rest of the day trading shots with the rebels to
their immediate front as well as small sorties against the
rebel works which accomplished little.53
As Burnside tried to get a handle on the fighting to
his front, Grant pushed him to send more troops in.
Increasingly frustrated at his commander’s impatience,
Burnside crumpled up and threw on the ground one
dispatch and, at another demand, verbally snapped at
Comstock. The firing continued at its heaviest near the
western salient of the Mule Shoe, which would soon get its
infamous name of the Bloody Angle. Hoping to help,
Burnside ordered more attacks, this time not at the eastern
salient, but at the rebel positions further south—at Heth’s
Salient. 54
Thomas Crittenden’s First Division was picked for
this task, and its two brigades began to advance through the
swampy ravines and bottomlands, crashing through the
woods closer and closer to Heth’s line. But with
Crittenden’s newness to the division, combind with the two
brigades’ near-total exhaustion, the fighting formation did
not make it far. As the Federals stumbled towards Heth’s
Salient, the Confederates behind their works readied their
rifles. The rebels in these works belonged to the two
brigades of Joseph Davis and Robert Mayo, who together
had about 2,300 men. As soon as Crittenden’s men came
53
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into view, the two brigades opened fire. Heth, who
ironically had been roommates with Burnside at West
Point, wrote, “[Crittenden’s] attack was met with firmness
and repelled with gallantry. The enemy left many dead and
wounded in our front. A stand of colors was captured
during this affair….” 55 Adding to his rather stoic report,
Heth allowed himself some more prose in his memoirs,
where he added, “On the [12th] of May my breastworks
[were] vigorously assailed by General Burnside… the
attacking force, or some of them, came within thirty paces
of my breastworks; at the same time my infantry poured a
shower of lead into Burnside’s troops. They were exposed
to a raking fire of my artillery on my right, where I had
some twenty pieces in position.” 56
Crittenden’s repulse left Burnside with only
Orlando Willcox’s division. The corps’ Third Division
moved off towards the salient, hoping to break through in
one-last attempt. With the fighting at the Bloody Angle
having descended into a maddened killing spree of little
overall importance, Burnside’s ultimate objective was to
break through Heth’s Salient, forcing Lee to move men
away from the Mule Shoe, potentially opening the door to a
final Federal success. Willcox’s two brigades moved off in
the same fashion as Crittenden, whose disjointed fragments
also tried to join the attack. Joining the infantry were four
55
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batteries of guns under the Ninth Corps Chief of Artillery,
Lieutenant Samuel Benjamin. 57 As Willcox’s two brigades,
under John Hartranft and Benjamin Christ, advanced they
soon came under the same fire that had met Crittenden’s
division, together with an added thrust—a Confederate
counter-attack of two brigades, centered against Willcox’s
left and aimed straight at the four batteries of artillery.
Looking to do the exact same thing as Grant, but in
reverse, Robert E. Lee looked to take pressure off the Mule
Shoe, and saw the easiest way to do so would be to hit the
Federal left—Burnside’s corps. Willcox’s attack was timed
almost perfectly to the same moment that the Confederate
attack struck out from the right flank of Heth’s Salient. The
two brigades belonged to David Weisiger and James Lane,
the latter having already repulsed Robert Potter earlier in
the morning. As Lane’s men led the attack, though, they
“commenced yelling too soon and drew upon themselves a
terrible fire of canister from four of the guns…” 58
The fighting around Benjamin’s batteries descended
into chaos. Willcox wrote in his diary, “At one time the
enemy was within ten paces, but the 2nd Michigan,
supporting this battery, re-manned the guns and with the
aid of canister of the other batteries, repulsed the charge
splendidly.” 59 While the fighting swirled about the
batteries, the musketry from within Heth’s Salient
57
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continued to hit Willcox’s brigades from the front, and
Willcox noted that “my front line suffered severely in
killed, wounded, and prisoners….” 60 Especially caught in
the middle, not only by the fire to their front, but also by
Weisiger’s and Lane’s counter-attack, the 17th Michigan
nearly ceased to exist—“only four dozen men escaped.” 61
Though it was able to repulse Weisiger and Lane,
Willcox’s division’s attack was spent before it really got a
chance to get underway. The attack slunk back to its
defensive works, ending, for all practical purposes, the
fighting around Heth’s Salient on May 12.
So ended Ambrose Burnside’s attacks on May 12 at
Spotsylvania. Strategically, why were they important? In
his memoirs, Grant perhaps expressed it best when he
wrote, “Burnside accomplished but little of a positive
nature, but negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from
reinforcing his [center] from that quarter.” 62 In other words,
Burnside’s attacks kept portions of three Confederate
divisions (Heth, Cadmus Wilcox, and William Mahone)
away from the Mule Shoe—troops that could have been
used to tip the balance and completely evict the Federal
breakthrough. Others, however, were not so willing to see
what Burnside had accomplished. Only knowing that
Burnside failed to break Heth’s line, a staff officer in the
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Sixth Corps wrote that Burnside was a “[damned]
humbug.” 63
It is difficult to get an understanding of the casualty
counts for the Ninth Corps as well as the Confederates from
the fighting near Heth’s Salient. In his report, Burnside
claimed that the corps had lost 1,500 killed, wounded, and
captured, but that figure also included losses in the days
following May 12. Confederate counts encompass the
entirety of the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, which
for Henry Heth, meant stand-up fights against the Second
Corps in the days before fighting against Burnside. For the
entire battle, Heth’s division suffered 350 casualties, while
Lane’s brigade, which seemed to be everywhere on May
12, claimed 470 casualties for the day. 64
Had Burnside broken through at Heth’s Salient, it
would have broken open Lee’s line. After the collapse of
the Mule Shoe, Lee had his engineers, joined by soldiers
who were routed from the initial clash there work
feverishly on a fallback line, digging into the wet earth with
“pick and shovel.” 65 However, that fallback line ran along
with, and incorporated Heth’s Salient. Had any of
Burnside’s attacks broken through, the entirety of the new
line would be useless as the Ninth Corps came crashing
down onto the unfinished trench system. From there, Lee’s
63
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options and his defensive nature against Grant would have
been severely limited.
But Burnside did not break through. He did not
break through because of the actions of the Confederates at
Heth’s Salient, who held steady in the face of three separate
attacks, and even managed their own attack that sent
Willcox’s division sprawling back in confusion. Any
discussion of what might have been beyond this is mere
conjecture and opinion. For all the damage done, the
bloodletting was not over. The armies would move steadily
south, all the way to Petersburg, where a mine, an
explosion, and a bloody crater waited for Major General
Ambrose Burnside.
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Brianna E. Kirk
“Popular understanding of treason, not legal
definitions in civil courts, guided actions by Union
functionaries, both high and low, throughout the Union and
Confederacy,” argues William A. Blair. Popular
conceptions of treason – widely shared definitions of
loyalty and disloyalty – merged with governmental policy
and the military to determine the punishment of traitors
both during and after the Civil War. Blair adds a flavor of
localism to the traditional narrative of treason in the midnineteenth century in his newest book With Malice Toward
Some, demonstrating that treason did in fact pervade public
discourse during the American Civil War. Blair argues that
the definition of treason arose more through a collaboration
amongst loyal citizens, than top-down policies.
Though it is the only crime defined in the United
States Constitution, Blair observes, the Founders
purposefully made a treason conviction hard to come by.
Since the U.S. had scant precedent regarding how to
address a treasonous offense, Union leaders pulled on
international law and foreign examples to guide them on
how to treat Confederates as “public enemies” without
relinquishing them a traitor’s punishment, with all three
branches of the government collectively reaching a
consensus on how to define and handle treason.
An interesting section of Blair’s book, and one that
is receiving more attention from scholars, is a chapter that
focuses on the military as an integral part in defining
treason and enforcing loyalty. “Many hands beyond the
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federal government contributed to the campaign against
disloyalty,” he writes. Members of the Union army opposed
treasonous language and often arrested ‘traitors’ based on
popular definitions of disloyalty – sometimes before higher
officials in the Lincoln administration could make an
official decision whether to support their action. The Union
military influence was also felt in elections, where Blair
persuasively claims that they “left a heavy footprint”
through the supervision of test oaths and oversight of the
ballots to ensure that those deemed disloyal could not vote,
especially in the borders states. Taken together, the arrests
and prosecution of disloyal people and the intimidation
faced at the ballot boxes lends the question as to whether
the military was working to “stifle political opposition,” or
simply enforce loyalty. It was such interactions between
soldiers and civilians that determined the “tempo” of
loyalty in Civil War America.
Blair’s analysis of the Northern desire to define,
locate, and punish treason culminates into the most
compelling and perplexing question of his study: Why did
the North not hang rebels at the war’s end? Despite
Northern outrage over the crimes committed against the
Union, no Confederates faced trial, punishment, or
execution for treason. Public debates over whether to seek
retribution against Confederate leaders like Jefferson Davis
delayed their punishment, and the complexity of
Reconstruction issues and politics took priority. The federal
government worried that pursuing treason trials for top
Confederates would not result in the desired convictions. In
addition, if rebels like Davis were found guilty of treason
and executed so soon after Appomattox, the Federal
government feared that they would be consecrated as
martyrs. Blair reminds us that even though Confederates
did not face the gallows, they received punishment in other
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forms. One of the most well-known of these was
Fourteenth Amendment, which robbed former Confederates
of their political and economic power in the newly rejoined
Union.
William Blair convincingly documents conceptions
of loyalty and disloyalty in nineteenth century America,
providing the topic of treason with the comprehensive
analysis that Civil War scholarship needed. Drawing from a
large source base of primary and secondary material, the
amount of research put into the study is evident on every
page. It is a bottom-up history of the complexities of
defining treason and loyalty in the Civil War North that is
driven by archives, a crucial aspect to the book’s success,
and is informed by military and legal history. Blair’s great
strength is that he does not approach the topic through a
narrow collection of specific examples, but rather
demonstrates how definitions of treason and loyalty were
constantly in flux in Northern society. Although Blair’s
work is an important contribution to the historiography of
the American Civil War, there is still more to be written
about treason and loyalty in the Civil War era. Other
scholars, especially cultural historians, can draw from
Blair’s work to delve deeper into the meaning of treason
and loyalty to see how these ideas and behaviors
intersected and interacted in post-war society.
Until then, Blair’s captivating study serves its
purpose as a key intervention in the field, revealing that
while many wanted to follow Lincoln’s idea to act merciful
toward the Confederacy, others were all too aware that the
war could have ended with Southern victory. Unprepared to
extend a forgiving hand to traitorous rebels, they wanted to
set a precedent and send a clear message to future
generations of Americans – that there could be mercy for
many, but malice toward some.
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